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We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability - the avoidance
of physical contact – by upper and backward caste Hindus vis-à-vis ‘scheduled’ castes (SCs) in
rural India. We hypothesize that an upper or Other Backward caste (OBC) household’s propensity
to practise untouchability is determined not solely by its own characteristics but, crucially, also
by the inter-group distribution of resources across both caste and religious divides, via political
contestation over behavioural norms. Our model predicts that greater collective resource
endowment (power) of SCs, or that of Muslims and Christians, will reduce the likelihood of an
upper caste or OBC household practising untouchability. A marginal redistribution of power from
OBCs to upper castes may reduce it as well. Greater power of the combined upper caste and OBC
bloc will increase it. Identifying a community’s power with its population weighted land share,
we find associations consistent with these predictions in data from the India Human Development
Survey 2011–12.
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1. Introduction
An extensive literature, stemming from the seminal work of Becker (1957), has sought to address the twin questions of how (a)
individual cost-benefit calculus may sustain or undercut economic and social discrimination, and (b) how such discrimination may in
turn affect the wellbeing of individuals. In reality, the cost-benefit structure, within whose parameters individuals take decentralized
decisions about whether to indulge their ‘taste’ for discrimination, is itself often determined by a prior process of conscious collective
political action undertaken by antagonistic groups. Competing political mobilizations and contestations around the US Civil Rights
movement, which critically influenced both the content and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation, constitute one example.
Yet, economic analyses of discrimination usually abstract from these prior political processes of collective action and group conflict.
This paper seeks to address this lacuna in the literature by foregrounding such processes as critical determinants of decentralized
individual decision-making, within the context of a particularly extreme form of socio-economic discrimination. Specifically, we
examine the role played by village-level community power in influencing the practice of untouchability amongst upper and backward
caste Hindus in rural India. We theoretically model the idea that a Hindu upper or backward caste household’s propensity to practise
untouchability vis-à-vis Hindu ‘scheduled’ castes is determined not solely by its own characteristics but, crucially, also by the
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inter-group distribution of resources across both caste and religious divides. We rationalize this as the consequence of village-level
conflicts over collective assertions of both caste and religious identities. Our empirical analysis draws attention to the community
power of ‘third parties’ such as Muslims and Christians, as well as social cleavages between upper and backward caste Hindus, as
possible explanations for much of the incidence of untouchability.
India’s caste system, a defining feature of Hinduism, is perhaps the world’s longest surviving social hierarchy. Traditionally, Hindu
society has been segmented into a complex ranking of various castes, based on notions of ritual purity. Brahmins were placed at the
apex, followed by other ‘Forward’ castes and the so-called ‘Other Backward’ castes (OBCs), while the so-called ‘Scheduled’ castes (SCs)
constituted the bottom of the hierarchy. Occupational specialization and endogamy have been the key characteristics of the system,
with Brahmins constituting the traditional intelligentsia, Forward castes (FCs) largely engaged in administration, law enforcement and
trade, OBCs constituting the primary component of the peasantry, and SCs confined to menial and low-end artisanal occupations.
Norms of ritual purity and pollution, which underlie the system, include the idea that individuals belonging to other castes would be
‘polluted’ by coming into physical contact with those born into the SC category. This leads to the practice of ‘untouchability’: the
avoidance of physical contact by the former with the latter. Historically, this entailed residential segregation, stringent restrictions on
social interaction between SCs and other castes including a complete taboo on inter-marriage, avoidance by other castes of food
handled by SCs, non-access of SCs to public spaces and communal facilities such as roads, village wells, schools, temples, and entry
barriers against SCs in most professions.1
Discrimination against SCs in general and the practice of untouchability in particular were made illegal by the Indian Constitution
immediately after Independence, and affirmative action programs were instituted for their benefit.2 However, despite legal prohibi
tion, the practice continues to limit access of SCs to public spaces and facilities, as well as informal social and professional networks,
especially in less developed rural areas. This restricts the accumulation of social capital on their part and puts up significant structural
barriers to their entry into historically upper caste occupations.3 An understanding of the factors that determine the prevalence of
untouchability thus remains of critical importance in reducing caste-based rigidities and entry barriers in India’s labour market.
Extensive, and often violent, conflicts between SCs and upper castes or OBCs, as well as between Hindus and Muslims, continue to
constitute arguably the most salient features of the political landscape in India.4 Such group conflicts provide the motivating backdrop
for our analysis. Our entry-point is the idea that the legitimacy of caste-exclusionary Hindu behavioural norms is contested at the village
level. It is determined as the outcome of a prior process of group conflict and negotiation between upper castes and OBCs on the one
hand, and SCs on the other. The outcomes of such caste contests are however affected by a simultaneous process of religious conflict
between Hindus and Muslims (or Christians). Hence, the incidence of untouchability is impacted by village-level differences in the
distribution of resources (and therefore political power) across caste and religious communities. An upper caste or OBC Hindu
household’s decision to practise untouchability is determined not solely by its own inherent characteristics (as in Thorat and Joshi,
2020), but, crucially, also by the inter-group distribution of collective resources, via the mediation of a process of political contestation.
As such, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to examine how collective caste power may determine the decentralized
and individual incidence of the practice of untouchability by upper caste and OBC Hindus, and we do so both theoretically and
empirically.
We develop a model of tripartite group contestation over social norms, wherein the combined upper caste and OBC Hindu bloc
engages in a contest with the SC community over the extent to which behavioural norms within the village should legitimise the
1
‘Scheduled Caste’ is the term used for these communities in the Constitution of India. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 lists
1,108 castes in its First Schedule. The scope and stringency of the restrictions faced by SCs varied across time and space, as well as according to caste
divisions among the SCs themselves. The system has been studied extensively by sociologists and historians (e.g., Ambedkar, 1946; Srinivas, 1952;
Dumont, 1970; Béteille, 1971; Gandhi, 1982 and Sharma, 1990). Economists’ attempts to theorize the presence and persistence of caste differ
entiation include Akerlof (1976), Scoville (1996), Bidner and Eswaran (2015) and Munshi (2019). These contributions however focus on the much
broader issue of identifying the economic functions that might rationalize the caste system. Our interest, instead, lies in the question of how
economic fundamentals might affect the degree to which one specific behavioural manifestation of that system, viz., the practice of untouchability,
is observed in contemporary India. Iyer (2018) provides an extensive recent overview and analysis of the literature on the economics of religion in
India, with particular reference to Hinduism.
2
Such affirmative action programs also cover the so-called Scheduled Tribes (STs). The social location of STs in relation to the traditional Hindu
caste hierarchy is however somewhat different from that of SCs – STs are located largely outside that hierarchy, while SCs are located at its bottom.
We leave STs out of the formal analysis in this paper partly for simplicity, partly due to their small numbers, and partly to highlight the difference in
their social location (and consequent communal self-identification) vis-à-vis SCs.
3
See Deshpande (2011), Mosse (2018) and Munshi (2019) for extended discussions and references to the literature. Shah et al. (2006), in their
study of untouchability covering 550 villages in 11 main states, found that SCs were prevented from full participation in local markets and often
from entering village shops in 30%–40% of the villages surveyed. In 45%–50% of these villages, SCs were prevented from selling milk to village
dairy cooperatives. Girard (2018) studies the exclusion of SCs from the use of public roads in rural India, in the policy context of electoral res
ervations for them.
4
For caste conflicts between SCs and upper castes or OBCs in contemporary India, see Sharma (2015) and Teltumbde (2018). A recent article in
the New York Times (Gettleman and Raj, 2018) provides useful case studies. Bros and Couttenier (2015) show that homicide rates of SC individuals
at the district level are positively and significantly correlated with public access to water, but higher caste homicide rates are not so. They interpret
this relationship as reflecting the upholding of untouchability rules, which are either violently enforced or serve as an excuse for caste-based
violence. Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson, 2005 are notable attempts by political scientists to understand violent Hindu-Muslim conflicts in
India, while Mitra and Ray (2014) offer a recent economic analysis of the same. The last contribution has some broad connections with our
theoretical model, which we discuss in Section 3.3 below.
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practice of untouchability, even as it seeks to impose Hindu values and rituals on religious minorities. There are four communities in
our model: SCs, upper castes (Brahmins and Forward castes), OBCs and non-Hindus (Muslims and Christians). Each community is
assumed to achieve perfect internal coordination, reflecting the presence of effective within-community governance structures, so that
it can be modelled as an individual allocating its resource endowment between material consumption and conflict over behavioural
norms, in order to best satisfy its preferences. Village social norms, determined as the equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous interplay of caste and religious contests, determine the cost to an individual from practising untouchability. Hindu upper caste and OBC
individuals take this cost as given and decide to practise untouchability if their individual (idiosyncratic) benefit from such behaviour
exceeds the cost.5
Our model predicts that any increase in the collective resource endowment (‘power’) of non-SC Hindus within the village, by
shifting the outcome of the caste conflict against SCs, will increase the proportion of upper caste or OBC households therein which
practise untouchability. The opposite holds for an increase in the power of SCs. Interestingly, any increase in the power of Muslims or
Christians will reduce this proportion. This happens due to greater diversion of resources from the caste conflict to the religious conflict
by non-SC Hindus in response to such an increase. Even more striking is the prediction that increases in the power of upper castes,
relative to that of the OBCs, may reduce the prevalence of untouchability amongst upper castes and OBCs as well. This happens due to
free-riding by upper castes on OBCs in both caste and religious conflicts, when the former are significantly resource-poor relative to the
latter. In those situations, a marginal redistribution of resources from OBCs to upper castes reduces the allocation by OBCs to the caste
conflict, without inducing upper castes to enter that conflict. Thus, upper castes continue to contribute nothing to it. Hence, the
outcome of the caste conflict shifts in favour of SCs – more non-SC Hindus choose not to practise untouchability in consequence. A
community’s resource endowment serves as an empirical proxy for its political power in our model, in that, ceteris paribus, a com
munity fares better in every conflict it engages in whenever its resource endowment increases.
Using rural household-level data from the India Human Development Survey II – 2011–12 (IHDS 2012), we seek empirical
confirmation of the comparative static associations predicted by our theoretical model, with regard to the outcome of the caste conflict,
i.e., the incidence of untouchability amongst upper caste and OBC Hindus. Data constraints prevent us from empirically examining
either the predictions regarding the outcome of the religious conflict, or those regarding conflict intensities and participation patterns,
generated by our theoretical analysis. For purposes of empirical scrutiny, we identify a community’s resource endowment (or power)
with its share of land weighted by its population share at the village level.6 We find a negative and statistically significant association
between the community power, so defined, of both SCs and non-Hindus (Muslims and Christians), and the likelihood of an upper caste
or OBC household practising untouchability. The association between the community power of upper castes and OBCs combined and
the likelihood of such a household practising untouchability is positive and significant. The estimated relationship between such
likelihood and the power of upper castes relative to that of the OBCs is negative at low levels of relative upper caste power, but positive
at high levels. Thus, our empirical findings regarding the association between community power and likelihood of an upper caste or
OBC household practising untouchability are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model (though they do not logically
suffice to validate the causality claims/mechanisms advanced in the latter).7 In sum, therefore, we are able to integrate the literature
on caste conflict with that on Hindu-Muslim conflict at a theoretical level, apply that integrated theoretical framework to the analysis
of untouchability, and generate novel findings with regard to the prevalence of that practice both theoretically and empirically. In so
doing, we are also able to address the more general question of how collective political action may affect individual incentives to
practise social discrimination. Our analysis thus carries broader methodological implications for investigation of social conflict and
discrimination beyond India.
Anderson (2011) and Iverson et al., 2014 consider the effect of caste divisions and caste power on household income of lower castes
in villages dominated by upper castes. In foregrounding the importance of village-level caste power in individual behavioural choices,
our analysis bears a family resemblance to theirs. We depart from them in addressing untouchability – a dimension unexplored by
them. Chauchard (2014) examines whether political quotas for SCs reduce discriminatory intentions of other castes against them,

5
Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005, 2007), Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011), Caselli and Coleman (2013), Mitra and Ray (2014), Dasgupta (2017),
Bakshi and Dasgupta (2018, 2020, 2021) and Dasgupta and Guha Neogi (2018) are examples of recent contributions to the theoretical modelling of
ethnic conflict. These however restrict themselves to conflicts between two ethnic groups. Our model extends this literature to simultaneous
conflicts across two dimensions involving at least three groups.
6
Our measure of a community’s resource endowment, and its interpretation in terms of that community’s political power, are both closely linked
to the notion of a ‘dominant’ caste introduced by Srinivas (1955) and discussed extensively in the sociological and anthropological literatures.
Srinivas (1955) defined a ‘dominant’ caste as that caste which is both numerically strong and wields preponderant economic and political power
within the village. Since land ownership is the principal source of economic power in rural India, and numbers matter in India’s electoral de
mocracy, numerical strength and land share constitute the key determinants of caste power in this definition. Numerical strength may impact caste
power in non-electoral ways as well. Conflicts and production both require the investment of human labour, and deploying caste brethren rather
than mercenaries or wage workers from other castes may serve to reduce both moral hazard and adverse selection problems, thereby increasing the
caste’s efficiency in production as well as contestation. The larger the pool of prospective recruits inside the caste, the greater such gains.
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, the larger the size of a caste, the larger the likelihood of it having members in key positions within the state apparatus
– the police, the administration and the judiciary. Having caste members in such strategic positions may help a caste consolidate both its material
wealth and political strength through partisan capture of the state apparatus. Our multiplicative combination of population and land shares provides
a simple way of formalizing and operationalizing the idea that wealth and numbers both matter in inter-group conflicts.
7
However, the theoretical predictions do not hold up as well empirically if we replace the caste power measure by the unweighted land share or
unweighted population share of the community, or even by their ratio.
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Table 1
Incidence of untouchability (%) in Indian states.
State
Madhya Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Bihar
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Gujarat
Chhatisgarh
Uttarakhand
India (except Maharashtra, West Bengal and
Kerala)
Odisha
India (all states)
Karnataka
Haryana
Assam
Tamil Nadu
Jharkhand
Jammu and Kashmir
Punjab
Andhra Pradesh
Maharashtra
WB
Kerala

(1)
Rural
All
45.5
43.8
41.3
35.7
35.5
34.9
33.3
31.6
28.4

(2)
Rural More Developed
Villages
41.6
33.40
40.55
30.92
31.36
34.9
39.92
13.04
23.06

(3)
Urban All (Metro & other urban
areas)
41.1
43.5
41.9
34.6
32.9
29.7
32.7
31.2
24.1

(4)
Urban
Metro
–
–
–
–
50.3
–
–
–
13.3

25.5
24.3
19.6
17.2
16.5
15.2
14.7
12.1
12.1
10.2
3.2
0.9
0.2

34.02
19.04
16.90
19.81
30.97
17.72
12.03
7.69
11.75
9.77
3.33
1.33
0.69

24.6
21.5
17.2
16.4
25.71
12.1
11.2
10.85
11.9
8.9
3.1
0.9
0.6

–
8.79
15.07
13.33
–
5.05
–
–
–
6.25
4.77
1.06
–

Note: Total number of untouchability observations for Rural All is 26,329, of which 12,345 observations pertain to More Developed villages. Total
number of observations for Urban All is 14,596, of which 3078 observations belong to Urban Metro.

while Girard (2018) studies how the exclusion of SCs from the use of public roads in rural India is affected by such quotas. Our analysis
shares the same broad objective – to identify factors that might reduce discrimination against SCs – but differs in its focus on structural
caste power, instead of affirmative action. Bros and Couttenier (2015) draw attention to the role of violence in the enforcement of
norms of untouchability, but do not investigate how caste power might influence the extent and consequences of such violence.
Sharma (2015) examines violence and property crimes against SCs as well, but without connecting them explicitly or tightly to un
touchability.8 We interpret inter-caste conflict and contestation, including but not limited to outright violence, as the process through
which structural caste power affects individual choices regarding the practice of untouchability.
Section 2 offers some preliminary observations from IHDS 2012 regarding the prevalence of the practice of untouchability in rural
(relative to urban/metro) areas of India across different states and caste groups. These findings serve as stylised facts for our analytical
model-building exercise in Section 3. In Section 4, we report and discuss the regression results that show the results from IHDS 2012 to
be consistent with the relevant predictions yielded by our theoretical model. We conclude in Section 5. Detailed proofs of propositions
are presented in an appendix.
2. The structure of untouchability in rural India
We begin with a general empirical investigation into the following questions: how extensive is the practice of untouchability in
rural India, and how do different communities, defined on the basis of caste and religion, vary with regard to their propensity to engage
in this practice?
The India Human Development Survey-II (2011–12) is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of rural and urban house
holds drawn from across Indian states. It is the first nationwide survey that includes information on whether the respondent households
practise untouchability. This information was not available in the India Human Development Survey-I (2004–05). Hence we are unable
to exploit the panel dimension of IHDS I and II. Focusing on rural households of the IHDS 2012, we have a sample of over 26000
households drawn from about 1200 villages.9 The household schedule of the 2011–12 IHDS posed the following question to the
primary respondent of each of the enumerated survey households: “Do some members practice untouchability in your household?”.

8
There is a loose connection, in that she considers crimes against SC/ST individuals perpetrated by non-SC/ST individuals that are registered
under the so-called Special and Local Laws (SLL). Many offenses included under SLL involve untouchability-related practices. However, other of
fenses covered under these laws need not necessarily involve untouchability per se. Thus, the category of SLL crimes considered by Sharma (2015) is
too broad to imply a strict positive association with untouchability. There is a reporting-related problem as well with assuming a robust positive
correlation between reported SLL crimes and the actual prevalence of untouchability-related practices. See Section 3.3 and footnote 20 for a detailed
discussion.
9
The complete IHDS II sample includes 26462 household-level observations from villages (more (12413) or less developed (14049)), metro
(3078) urban areas as well as other urban (11518) areas. The numbers in parentheses indicate the household-level observations in each case.
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Table 2
Community-specific incidence of practising untouchability (rural all-India).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Community

(1)
Population share
(%)

(2)
Land share
(%)

(3)
Population share practising
untouchability (%)

Brahmin
Forward Caste
Upper/General Caste (Brahmin þ
Forward Caste)
OBC
(Brahmin + Forward Caste + OBC)
ST
SC
Muslim
Other
Non-Hindus (Muslim þ Other)
Total (1–7)

4
14
18

7
25
31

2.2
4.7
6.9

(4)
Probability of practising untouchability
column 3 value
(
)
column 1 value
0.56
0.34
0.38

35
53
9
21
10
7
17
100

39
70
7
11
11
8
19
100

11
17.9
2.2
2.2
1.1
0.6
1.7
24

0.32
0.34
0.25
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.24

Note: The table shows the community specific incidence of untouchability in the rural sample. Total number of valid household-level observations is
26,329. The figures shown in the table involve rounding approximations.

The answer was recorded as a “Yes/No”. We use this information as the key measure of untouchability.
Table 1 shows, for each state, the proportion of respondent households who admitted to practising untouchability, expressed as a
percentage of the total number of households interviewed in that state, classified by region. The percentages in Table 1 can thus be
interpreted as the likelihood of untouchability being practised, or its incidence, in the major Indian states. As shown in column (1) of
Table 1, 24.3% of all rural households in the full sample admitted to practising untouchability in some form. This country-wide
incidence however disguises sharp state-level differences. Kerala, West Bengal and Maharashtra appear outliers, in that, at less
than 3.5%, the rural incidence of untouchability appears negligible in all these states, as compared to the above 10% incidence
registered by the next best performer, Andhra Pradesh (including Telengana).10 The country-wide incidence accordingly increases to
28.4% if we drop the three outlier states from our sample. With above 40% self-reported levels of incidence, Madhya Pradesh,
Himachal Pradesh and Bihar appear the worst performers, with Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat following close behind, clustered
as they are tightly around 35%. Thus, despite a constitutional ban, the practice of untouchability in some form remains extensive on
average in the rural areas of every large state except Maharashtra, Kerala and West Bengal. A comparison of the rural (column 1) and
urban (column 3) untouchability figures indicates that urban untouchability is somewhat lower in some states though not always. If,
however, we focus on the more developed villages (column (2)) or metro urban areas, i.e., urban areas with more than 2 million
population (column (4)), the untouchability average goes down drastically.
Clearly, untouchability is a sensitive issue, and so it may be difficult to obtain honest responses from survey households. Our
theoretical analysis in Section 3, being a comparative static exercise, will however only concern the direction of change in the inci
dence of untouchability, not its magnitude. Hence, the possibility of under-reporting per se will not create any difficulties for our
empirical application of that theoretical analysis in Section 4. So long as the true incidence is a positive monotone function of the
reported incidence, i.e., so long as the true untouchability ranking between any two situations is identical to that according to reported
incidence, measuring one by the other remains innocuous for our purposes. While under-reporting across the board appears quite
possible, it is intuitively difficult to see why the extent of under-reporting within rural India would vary systematically in such a way as
to generate large-scale rank reversal between real and reported incidence.
Are there important cross-community variations in the incidence of this practice? Our data-set allows us to partition the population
into the following communities: (a) amongst Hindus, we have Brahmins, Forward Castes (FC), Other Backward Castes (OBC),
Scheduled Tribes (ST), and of course, the victims of the practice of untouchability, viz., Scheduled Castes (SC); (b) amongst nonHindus, we have Muslims, and Others, i.e. Christians, Sikhs, Parsees, Jains and Buddhists, with Christians forming the largest
component. Table 2 presents the community-specific population shares (column 1), land shares (column 2), shares of community
households practising untouchability (column 3) and the community-specific likelihoods of practising untouchability (column 4); all
for rural areas. Note that the column 4 figures are obtained by dividing column 3 figures by those in column 1.
Table 2 reveals that every rural community practises untouchability to some extent. Strikingly, SCs have about 11% likelihood of

10

Telengana was carved out of Andhra Pradesh as a separate state in 2014.
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practising untouchability themselves. This reflects the continuing hold of caste hierarchies within the SC community itself and the
discrimination against certain SC castes practised by other SC castes (see, for example, Kumar and Somanathan, 2017). Muslims and
Others, who all profess religions with neither untouchability nor, indeed, a formal caste hierarchy, exhibit similar propensities.
However, these communities are all far less likely to practise untouchability than the overall population. STs, who have traditionally
been placed outside the Hindu caste hierarchy and constitute the most disadvantaged social group according to almost every social
indicator, appear to be about as prone to the practice as the overall population.11
Brahmins, Forward castes and OBCs all exhibit much greater susceptibility to the practice than the population as a whole. About a
third of the rural OBC population in our sample admitted to practising untouchability. The corresponding proportion for Forward caste
households was about a third as well. Thus, rural Forward castes and rural OBCs appear quite similar in their propensity to engage in
the practice. Brahmins are most likely to engage in the practice, with almost 6 out of every 10 rural Brahmin households admitting to it.
However, the Brahmin population share at about 4% appears too small for them to be considered as the primary driving force behind
the practice. Furthermore, the socio-hierarchical, economic and cultural distances between Brahmins and Forward castes are all
generally small, compared to those between these communities and the OBCs. Brahmins and Forward castes together constitute the
main component of the category officially termed ‘General Castes’, whose members fall outside the ambit of caste-based affirmative
action programs, whereas OBC individuals qualify for such programs (subject to a generous household income ceiling). Accordingly, in
our theoretical model in Section 3, we shall model Brahmins and Forward castes as constituting one unified group, while OBCs will be
assumed to constitute another. The practice of untouchability will be driven by the combined efforts of these two caste blocs. NonHindus will play a passive role, reflecting their low propensities to practise untouchability, as reported in Table 2.
Table 2 further reveals that the caste blocs most susceptible to the practice of untouchability, viz., upper/general castes and OBCs,
are also those who own most of the land in rural India. Together, these castes own about 70% of the total land in our sample, but their
population share is marginally over 50%. The land share of the upper castes is almost double their population share. Conversely, SCs
are the most land-poor community in relative terms – their land share is about half their population share. Since land remains the
primary form of wealth in rural India, inequality in the distribution of land largely reflects wider caste-based inequalities in wealth or
asset ownership in general.
3. A theoretical model of within-village group conflict over social norms
We now develop a theoretical model to highlight how the inter-community distribution of resources within a village may jointly
determine the prevalence of untouchability therein.
3.1. Group conflict and equilibrium determination of village norms
Suppose the population of a village can be partitioned into four communities: Hindu general (or upper) castes (U), Hindu OBCs (B),
Hindu SCs (S) and non-Hindus (M). Brahmins and Forward castes together constitute U, while Muslims and Christians are the primary
constituents of M. As noted earlier in Section 1 (footnote 2), we leave out STs partly for the sake of simplicity, partly to reflect their
largely outsider status in the Hindu social hierarchy, and partly due to their small numbers. We abstract from the issue of preference
differences and coordination problems within each community, by assuming that each community can be modelled as an individual.12
We shall denote by H the set of all non-S Hindu individuals, i.e., all individuals who are either upper caste or backward caste: H =
[U ∪ B]. Each community i ∈ {S, U, B, M, H} is endowed with ρi amount of resources. Define θ ≡ ρρU . The parameter θ measures the
H

extent of dominance of upper castes within the non-SC Hindu community (H) in terms of share of community resources, so that ρU =
θρH , and ρB = (1 − θ)ρH . Thus, the community resource endowments ρS , ρM , ρH and the upper caste share θ constitute the parameters
of our model. We assume that ρS , ρM , ρH > 0 and θ ∈ (0,1).Community i ∈ {S, U, B, M} can allocate its resource endowment ρi between
material consumption and conflict with other communities over the sharing of two different extra-economic ‘normative’ goods. The
normative goods are denoted T and R. The amount of each normative good is unity.
The normative good T is to be interpreted as the composite of social norms, rituals and conventions which govern all social
interaction within the extended Hindu community, consisting of upper castes, backward castes and SCs. A larger share of this good
accruing to the non-SC subgroup, H, implies that the social norms and conventions within the village reflect, to a greater extent, the
values and cultural prejudices of upper and backward caste Hindus, as opposed to those of scheduled castes. As noted earlier, the
practice of untouchability vis-à-vis the SCs is legitimised by, and is thus a behavioural consequence of, norms of ritual pollution

11
Thorat and Joshi (2020, p. 40) explain this in the following manner: “The tribes have always owned land and even functioned as independent
kingdoms. They would, therefore, understandably consider themselves as being superior to the lowest of the castes, who have no rights whatsoever.”
We agree with this view. Some groups among Buddhists and Sikhs are recognized by the Government of India as SCs. We cannot rule out the
possibility that our sample of SC households contains some Buddhist and Sikh households as well – those who self-identified as SCs rather than
Buddhist or Sikh. Muslim or Christian individuals however cannot claim SC status, and Buddhists and Sikhs together constitute less than 2.5% of
India’s population. The proportion of Buddhists and Sikhs in the SC population in our sample may even be less than their tiny population share,
since it seems probable that some of them identified themselves according to their religion rather than as SCs in their survey response. Not much is
therefore lost by thinking of the SC bloc as entirely Hindu.
12
This modelling choice is made for algebraic simplicity. As discussed in Section 3.2(v), fully decentralized decision-making within each com
munity makes no substantive difference to our conclusions.
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adopted primarily by non-SC Hindus. Hence, a larger share of T accruing to the H group will be taken to mean greater tolerance or
legitimacy of the practice of untouchability within the Hindu community, and consequently, greater segregation of SCs from the daily
collective life of upper castes and OBCs. For brevity, we shall term T the caste good. The share of the normative good R accruing to M
measures the relative extent to which public spaces within the village, and its collective life, accommodate collective acts of symbolic
and religious assertion by non-Hindus. We shall term R the religion good.
Let D ≡ {T, R}. The pay-off function of community i ∈ {S, U, B, M} is given by:
∑
πi =
gij Vij + F(ni )
(3.1)
j∈D

where Vij is community i’s valuation of the normative good j, gij is the share of the normative good j accruing to community i, and ni is
that community’s material consumption. We shall assume that the function F is increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the standard
′
′
′
Inada conditions, i.e., F > 0, F′′ < 0, lim F (ni ) = ∞ and lim F (ni ) = 0. We shall also assume that the community valuations of the
ni →0

ni →∞

caste and religion goods satisfy the following restrictions.

Assumption 1. (i) VMT = 0 < VMR ; (ii) VSR = 0 < VST ; (iii) VUT , VUR > 0; (iv) VBT , VBR > 0 and (v) VUT = VBT , VUR = VBR .
As noted in Section 2 (Table 2), upper castes and OBCs are most prone to practising untouchability, and Muslims/Others the least.
Furthermore, the propensity to discriminate for OBCs is about the same as that exhibited by Forward castes. Assumption 1 builds into
the model these broad stylized facts. By Assumption 1, M derives no benefit from T. Hence M does not participate in the contest over T.
This incorporates the idea that non-Hindus are neutral towards conflicts within the Hindu community. Similarly, S derives no benefit
from R, and therefore does not participate in the contest over its division. This builds in the idea that SCs, being confined to the margins
of Hindu society, do not identify much with the dominant belief systems of the latter, which legitimize their own marginalization.
Consequently, SCs do not share the antagonism towards non-Hindus that a strong and exclusive personal identification with Hindu
society typically entails.13 Both U and B, however, have positive and identical valuations of the two normative goods.14 They may both,
therefore, potentially engage in a contest over the division of T with S and another over the division of R with M.
The division of the caste good, T, between H and S is determined according to the standard Tullock (1980) contest success function:
xST
if (xST + xHT )>0
xST + xHT

gST =
=

(3.2)

1
otherwise;
2

where xST and xHT are the amounts allocated by S and H, respectively, to the contest over T; xHT ≡ xUT + xBT . We shall denote the total
resource allocation to the caste conflict (i.e., (xST + xHT + xMT )) by XT . Similarly, the division of the religious good, R, between H and
M is given by:
gMR =
=

xMR
if (xMR + xHR )>0
xMR + xHR

(3.3)

1
otherwise;
2

where xMR and xHR are the amounts allocated by M and H, respectively, to the contest over R; xHR ≡ xUR + xBR . We shall denote the total
resource allocation to the religious conflict (i.e., (xMR + xHR + xSR )) by XR . Furthermore, we shall assume that:
(3.4)

gUT = gBT = (1 − gST ); gUR = gBR = (1 − gMR ).

By (3.4), both T and R involve non-rival and non-excludable consumption within the H group (U and B): these are both pure public
goods for non-SC Hindus taken as a whole. However, neither U nor B can internalize the benefits accruing from T and R to the other.
The two constituents of the non-SC Hindu bloc cannot therefore coordinate their conflict participation with one another. This feature of
our model is meant to capture the consequences of deep social cleavages between upper castes and OBCs – social cleavages that both
cause and are in turn perpetuated by low levels of inter-marriage.15 All communities i ∈ {S, U, B, M} simultaneously choose the
allocation of their respective resources ρi between material consumption and contest expenditures, so as to maximize the pay-off
function in (3.1), subject to Assumption 1, the contest success functions (3.2)-(3.4), and the budget constraints:

13

As we discuss in detail in Section 3.2., both assumptions may be relaxed without substantively altering our conclusions.
The assumption that [VUT = VBT , and VUR = VBR ] is algebraically convenient but not essential.
15
These cleavages can and often lead to endemic political conflict between upper castes and OBCs. Our point is not that there is an absence of
conflict between upper castes and OBCs, but that such conflict is typically confined to issues separate from untouchability, which constitutes our
focus. We discuss in Section 3.2(iv) how explicitly incorporating contests between upper castes and OBCs over issues other than untouchability does
not change our conclusions. Similarly, there is a great deal of socio-economic heterogeneity within the OBC bloc, as well as a large element of
political conflict among different OBC castes. These qualifications are however tangential to our central concern, namely untouchability, and are
therefore abstracted from in our modelling exercise.
14
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(3.5)

ni = ρi − xiT − xiR .
16

The model outlined above bears a family resemblance to those studied in the literature on conflict in multiple battlefields. As in
that literature, one set of combatants (viz., U and B) maximizes an aggregation of the pay-offs from the different battlefields. However,
unlike the standard practice in that literature, the same agents do not confront one another in multiple battlefields in our model – U and
B confront S in the conflict over enforcement of norms of ritual pollution and caste hierarchy, whereas they confront M over the
privileging of Hindu symbols, values and practices over those of other religions. Notice that this departure would obtain even if we
permitted SCs to participate in the religious contest alongside non-SC Hindus and non-Hindus to participate in the caste contest against
SCs alongside non-SC Hindus. The tripartite structure of our model implies that S, H and M would all face different enemies on different
battlefields, even if all three groups were to participate in both conflicts. This tripartite structure differentiates our model from most of
the standard literature on conflicts in multiple battlefields. Furthermore, our model builds in coordination failures within one
particular combatant bloc – a feature not usually present in that literature. If we assume that SCs do experience antagonism towards
non-Hindus, i.e., VSR > 0, then our problem can alternatively be modelled as a variant of those analysing simultaneous between and
within group contests (e.g., Hausken, 2005; Münster, 2007; Dasgupta, 2009 and Choi et al., 2016). Our substantive comparative static
conclusions will remain unchanged under this alternative formulation, so long as SCs are sufficiently resource-poor relative to non-SC
Hindus. We shall discuss these possible variants of our benchmark model in detail in Section 3.2 below.
′
It is easy to check that the game specified above must have at least one Nash equilibrium. Recalling that F′′ < 0, lim F (ni ) = ∞, θ ≡
ρU
ρH

and ρH ≡ ρU + ρB , (3.1)-(3.5) immediately yield the following observation.

ni →0

Let Assumption 1 hold. Given any ρH , ρS ,ρM > 0, there exist θ, θ ∈ (0, 1), θ < 12 < θ, such that in any Nash equilibrium: (i) [xBR ,
[
]
(
xBT , xMR , xST > 0 and xUR , xUT , xSR , xMT = 0] if θ ∈ 0, θ , (ii) [(xBR +xBT ), (xUR +xUT ), xMR , xST > 0 and xSR , xMT = 0] if θ ∈ θ , θ), and

Lemma 1.

(iii) [xBR , xBT , xSR , xMT = 0 and xUR , xUT , xMR , xST > 0] if θ ∈ (θ, 1].
Lemma 1 implies that, when upper castes control a relatively small share of non-SC Hindu resources, so that OBCs form the
dominant bloc within this group (H), the former will free ride on the latter in both religious conflict and caste conflict. The U com
munity will allocate its entire resource to its own material consumption. B will however allocate positive amounts of resource to both
caste and religious contestations. These roles will be reversed when the upper castes are sufficiently more resourceful relative to the
backward castes. In the intermediate zone, where the two communities are not too unequal in terms of resource endowment, both will
contribute positive amounts to conflict. In these cases, multiple Nash equilibria will exist. The total amount of resources contributed by
any community to conflict will be positive and uniquely determinate. However, the division of that deployment between religious
conflict and caste conflict will be indeterminate for both U and B. Obviously, M and S will always participate in, i.e., contribute positive
amounts to, religious and caste conflict, respectively.
In light of the discussion above, Lemma 1 yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, given any ρH , ρS ,ρM > 0, there exist θ, θ ∈ (0, 1), θ < 12 < θ, such that a Nash equilibrium is
characterized by the following set of conditions:
( )
( )
xST
xMR
′
′
V
VBR = min{F ((1 − θ)ρH − xBT − xBR ), F (θρH − xUT − xUR )};
=
(3.6)
BT
XT 2
XR 2
(

)
xHR
′
VMR = F (ρM − xMR );
2
XR

(3.7)

(

)
xHT
′
VST = F (ρS − xST )
2
XT

(3.8)

and
)
(
′
′
[F ((1 − θ)ρH − xBT − xBR ) < F (θρH )] if θ ∈ 0, θ ,
[
]
′
′
[F ((1 − θ)ρH − xBT − xBR ) = F (θρH − xUT − xUR )] if θ ∈ θ , θ ,
and
′

(3.9)

′

[F ((1 − θ)ρH ) > F (θρH − xUT − xUR )] if θ ∈ (θ, 1)

Conditions (3.6)-(3.8) are statements of the first order conditions of U and B, M and S, respectively. Together, (3.6) and (3.9) imply
that the marginal utility from expenditure on material consumption must be greater than that on conflict of any kind for U in

16

See Kovenock and Roberson (2012) for a survey.
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equilibrium if that community is significantly poorer than B in terms of its resource endowment. Consequently, it will allocate its entire
resource to material consumption, free riding on B for access to the two normative goods. B must equate the marginal utility of
expenditure on material consumption with those of contributions to both religious and caste conflicts. The opposite will hold when U is
sufficiently better endowed than B. When the two communities have broadly similar resource endowments, marginal utilities will be
equated across all three items for both B and U. U and B will have identical material consumption in this case. It can be shown that
(
]
(3.6)-(3.9) imply uniqueness of the equilibrium when either θ ∈ 0, θ or θ ∈ [θ, 1). The equilibrium values of normative good shares
gST and gMR must always be uniquely defined, as well as those of material consumption for all four communities, given the parameters
(
)
of the model ρS , ρM , ρH and θ. However, when we have θ ∈ θ ,θ , xUT , xUR , xBT and xBR must all be individually indeterminate, leading
to multiple Nash equilibria, though (xUT +xUR ), (xBT +xBR ) and (xUT +xBT ) will all be determinate.
How do changes in communal resource endowments, by impacting the simultaneous group contestations over caste and religion,
affect equilibrium acceptability of untouchability, modelled as the equilibrium share of the normative caste good accruing to the SC
community (gST )?
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 hold, and let gST * , gMR * be the values of gST and gMR , respectively, in a Nash equilibrium corre
sponding to some initial configuration of ρH , ρS , ρM and θ. Suppose further that gST * , gMR * < 12. Then, ceteris paribus:
(i) any fall in either ρM or ρS must reduce the equilibrium value of gST ;
(ii) any rise in ρH must reduce the equilibrium value of gST ;
and
(
)
(iii) there exist θ, θ ∈ (0, 1), θ < 12 < θ, such that any rise in θ over 0, θ must increase the equilibrium value of gST , any rise in θ over
]
[
θ , θ must keep it invariant, while any rise in θ over (θ, 1) must reduce it.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 refers to an initial equilibrium situation where upper and backward caste Hindus collectively dominate both SCs and
religious minorities, in the minimal sense of receiving the larger share of both normative goods. Thus, in the initial situation, the
collective social norms governing social interaction within the overall Hindu community in the village embody more caste Hindu
beliefs regarding ritual pollution than their negation. Analogously, the collective life of the village is organised more according to the
symbols, rituals and practices of non-SC Hindus than those identified with religious minorities. It is easy to see that this must
necessarily be the case if the total resource endowment of upper and backward castes is sufficiently greater than those of both SCs and
non-Hindus in the village (i.e., if ρH is sufficiently greater than max{ρS , ρM }). Then, by Proposition 2(i), any fall in the resource
endowment of either non-Hindus or SCs must reduce gST , i.e., increase the extent to which the practice of untouchability is considered
normatively legitimate or acceptable within the village. Any rise in the resource endowment of non-SC Hindus (ρH ) will have the same
effect (Proposition 2(ii)). Perhaps most interestingly, an increase in the share of upper castes in the total resource endowment of nonSC Hindus has a non-monotone impact on village norms legitimizing the practice of untouchability (Proposition 2(iii)). When back
ward castes are significantly better endowed than upper castes, marginal increases in the resource share of the latter vis-à-vis those of
the former makes untouchability less legitimate. Thus, given the total resource endowment of the non-SC Hindu community, a
reduction of the dominance of backward castes vis-à-vis upper castes has the effect of making villages norms less tolerant of un
touchability. However, when upper castes dominate backward castes in terms of resource endowment, further improvements in their
relative resource position causes greater dominance of upper caste ideas of ritual purity, which legitimize the practice of
untouchability.
The mechanisms generating the relationships highlighted by Proposition 2 are the following. Any decrease in the resource
endowment of non-Hindus permits non-SC Hindus to reallocate some resource from religious conflict to caste conflict. This shifts the
outcome of the caste conflict further against SCs. Any decrease in the endowment of the SC community reduces its allocation to the
caste contest, thereby reducing the opposition to notions of ritual purity and increasing the legitimacy of untouchability. Any increase
in the endowment of the non-SC Hindu community increases its allocation to the caste contest and thereby increases the legitimacy of
untouchability. As already noted in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, when backward castes dominate upper castes sufficiently in terms of
resource endowment, the latter withdraw from all conflict, choosing instead to free-ride on the backward castes for access to the
normative goods. In such a situation, a marginal redistribution of resources from B to U reduces the ability of OBCs to defend norms of
ritual purity against SCs, but does not induce upper castes to enter the caste conflict. Thus, OBCs reduce their allocation to the caste
conflict, but upper castes continue to contribute nothing to it. The outcome therefore shifts in favour of SCs - the legitimacy of un
touchability declines in consequence. The opposite effect obtains when upper castes dominate backward castes enough to make the
latter free-ride on the former. In the intermediate zone, both B and U contribute to conflict. A marginal resource redistribution from,
say, B to U, then has no impact on equilibrium consumption bundles: the loser community B reduces its total conflict contribution by
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the amount lost, while the gainer community U increases its total conflict contribution by the exact same amount, so that the equi
librium shares and material consumption levels in any post-redistribution equilibrium remain exactly the same as those in any preredistribution equilibrium.17
Remark 1. An interesting outcome obtains when gMR * > 12 in the initial equilibrium, i.e., non-Hindus dominate non-SC Hindus. Then,
as can be easily checked, an increase in the resource endowment of the non-Hindu bloc (ρM ) induces non-SC Hindus to transfer re
sources from the religious conflict to the caste conflict. The equilibrium value of gST falls in consequence – the outcome of the caste
conflict shifts against the SCs. This suggests that, in villages dominated by Muslims or Christians, greater resource acquisition by them
may increase the extent to which the practice of untouchability is considered normatively acceptableamongst the Hindu population of
the village, even if Muslims/Christians themselves remain neutral in the caste conflict. Since very few villages in our sample can be said
to be dominated by non-Hindu communities, either numerically or in terms of land shares, we shall ignore this possibility in our
empirical analysis presented in Section 4 below. Notice that, by an exactly analogous reasoning, in villages where SCs dominate both
upper castes and OBCs (gST * > 12), greater resource acquisition by SCs may increase the extent to which Hindus dominate non-Hindus,
even if SCs themselves do not participate in the religious contestation against non-Hindus.
Remark 2. Given Assumption 1, the equilibrium value of gST is increasing in ρS and decreasing in ρH . Analogously, the equilibrium
value of gMR is increasing in ρM but decreasing in ρH . This clarifies the exact sense in which a community’s resource endowment can be
identified with its political power in our model – other parameters remaining constant, a community fares better in every conflict it
engages in whenever its resource endowment increases.
3.2. Variants of the model
(i) We have assumed that SCs derive no benefit from the religious good, i.e., VSR = 0 (Assumption 1). This assumption ensures that
SCs do not participate in religious conflict, but is not necessary to do so. To see this, suppose instead that VSR ≤ VBR , and gUR =
gBR = gSR . Suppose also that VST ≥ VBT , with the other restrictions in Assumption 1 remaining unchanged. Given these para
metric extensions of our benchmark model, assume S participates in the religious conflict. Then, noting (3.6), we must have:
( )
( )
xHT
xMR
′
VST =
VSR = F (ρS − xST − xSR )
2
XT
XR 2
(

)
( )
xST
xMR
′
′
VBT = min{F ((1 − θ)ρH − xBT − xBR ), F (θρH − xUT − xUR )} ≥
VBR .
2
XT
XR 2

We must therefore have:
( )( )
xST
VBT
min{F’ ((1 − θ)ρH − xBT − xBR ), F ’ (θρH − xUT − xUR )} VBR
≥ 1.
=
≥
xHT
VST
VSR
F’ (ρS − xST − xSR )
( )
( )
′
′
xST
This yields: (a) min{F ((1− θ)ρHF−′ (xρBT−− xxBR− ),Fx (θ) ρH − xUT − xUR )} ≥ 1, and (since VVBT
≤
1)
(b)
≥ 1. Since F′′ < 0, (a) implies (ρS − xST −
xHT
ST
S

ST

SR

xSR ) ≥ max{(ρB − xBT − xBR ),(ρU − xUT − xUR )}; i.e., neither upper castes nor OBCs can have higher group material consumption than
SCs; (b) implies SCs are not socially dominated by non-SC Hindus (gST * ≥ 12). Thus, SCs can participate in religious conflict only in
villages where they are neither socially nor materially dominated by upper castes or OBCs. This is a requirement intuitively difficult to
square with an overwhelming majority of India’s villages, and one would expect untouchability to be low anyway in the small sub-set
of villages where SCs dominate non-SC Hindus both socially and materially. Since the precondition gST * < 12 is specified in the statement
of Proposition 2, the results collated there would remain entirely unaltered even under the more general parametric restrictions
discussed in this section. We have therefore simplified the algebra by assuming VSR = 0 in our benchmark model – since this does not
′
affect the statement of Proposition 2, nothing of empirical importance is lost thereby. As lim F (ni ) = ∞, it is obvious that, given ρM , ρH
ni →0

and θ, S must withdraw from the religious conflict when ρS is below some threshold (though it is tedious to characterize that threshold
formally).
(ii) Suppose now that we replace the assumption that non-Hindus derive no benefit from the caste good (VMT = 0 in Assumption 1
(i)) by the weaker assumption that VMT ≤ VBT , and assume that gUT = gBT = gMT . Intuitively, this corresponds to a situation
where non-Hindus share upper caste and OBC bias against SCs. Suppose further that VMR ≥ VBR . Then, by an argument exactly
analogous to that developed in Section 3.2(i) above, it follows that non-Hindus will participate in the caste conflict only in
17
This follows immediately from the well-known neutrality property of Cournot games of voluntary contributions to pure public goods, first
highlighted in a seminal paper by Bergstrom et al. (1986). See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007, 2011) for detailed discussions of this property.
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villages where they are not dominated by Hindus in the religious conflict (gMR * ≥ 12). Hence, Proposition 2 remains unchanged.
In villages where non-Hindus dominate Hindus in the religious conflict, any increase in the resource endowment of non-Hindus
will increase social acceptance of untouchability in our augmented model, but this happens in our benchmark model as well
(Remark 1). Thus, no additional predictive power with regard to untouchability is generated by permitting non-Hindus to derive
positive psychic benefits from practising untouchability vis-à-vis Hindu SCs.
(iii) Yet another way to model intra-village conflicts might be in terms of a standard model of simultaneous internal vs. external
conflict, wherein all Hindu groups contest non-Hindus for a larger share of the religious good, even as the SCs contest non-SC
Hindus over the intra-Hindu division. In this formulation, the caste and religious public goods merge into a single composite
public good, with valuations Vi ,i ∈ {S,M,U,B}. Then, if SCs participate in the conflict with non-Hindus, the first order conditions
for S yield:
( ) (
( )( )
)
xHT
XR − xMR
xST
xMR
′
VS
= F (ρS − xST − xSR ) =
VS ,
2
XR
XT
XT
XR 2

with the subscript T now standing for intra-Hindu conflict between SC and non-SC Hindus, and the subscript R standing for conflict
between Hindus and non-Hindus, as in our benchmark model. Assuming, as before, that VB = VU , the first order conditions for the nonSC Hindu groups yield:
( ) (
( )( )
)
xST
XR − xMR
xHT
xMR
′
′
VB
= min{F ((1 − θ)ρH − xBT − xBR ), F (θρH − xUT − xUR )} ≥
VB .
2
XR
XT
XT
XR 2
[( ) ( )]
xST
Combining, we get:
≥ xxHT
. Thus, SCs will participate in the external conflict with non-Hindus only if they are not
xHT
ST
dominated in the internal conflict with non-SC Hindus. Hence, the condition under which SCs will participate in the religious, or
external, conflict, remains the same as that in the first variant of the benchmark model discussed above (Section 3.2(i)), and therefore
similarly unlikely in practice. This offers yet another theoretical justification for viewing the assumption VSR = 0 in our benchmark
model as not especially limiting in its empirical implications.18
Notice that the multiple battlefields structure, adopted both in our benchmark model and its extension in Section 3.2(i), differs
fundamentally from the internal vs. external conflict alternative outlined above. In the first, the prize in either battlefield is inde
pendent of that in the other, but their valuations are inter-dependant in the second. The intuitive interpretations vary accordingly. In
the first, the caste good refers to norms of individual intra-Hindu interaction between SCs and non-SCs. The sites of this contestation are
fundamentally different from, and independent of, the sites of religious contestation. For example, whether an SC individual is
normatively expected to maintain physical distance from upper caste Hindus or is permitted to eat alongside the latter at a wedding
banquet is an issue fundamentally independent of questions such as what proportion of communal village land should be set aside for
Muslim burials rather than Hindu festivals. The multiple-battlefields structure of our model, with its prizes valued independently of
one another, permits us to focus on norms governing individual intra-Hindu interactions, occurring at sites (such as the household or
small-scale social gatherings) which are separate from sites of religious conflict. The internal vs. external conflict structure, on the
other hand, applies naturally to cases of group access, where the sites of conflict are the same, or at least strongly inter-connected. The
benefit derived by SC individuals from having a larger proportion of village commons set aside for Hindu festivals can be expected to
vary positively with the extent to which they are actually allowed to participate in such festivals. Thus, the different model structures
imply differences in intuitive interpretation of the sites or nature of contestations over untouchability. It seems to us that the survey
question regarding individual practice of untouchability in our data-set is more likely to capture constraints on inter-personal inter
action rather than group access. We have accordingly chosen the multiple-battlefields structure for our model, rather than an internal

18

Some commentators (e.g., Shani, 2007) have emphasized the part played by “Hindutvaised” SCs in urban areas during the 2002 anti-Muslim
violence in Gujarat. However, in their large-scale statistical analysis, Dhattiwala and Biggs (2012) find that violence was actually higher where
SCs constituted a smaller proportion of the population. This is consistent with the predictions of our model. They further note that, out of Hindus
convicted of killing Muslims in 2002, an overwhelming majority are upper-caste Patidars. Analyzing data from a country-wide electoral survey in
2019, Chibber and Verma (2019, Table 4) find their measures of religious practice, Hindu nationalism and ethno-political majoritarianism all to be
the lowest among the group they define as being of ‘very low socioeconomic status’. Since SCs are overwhelmingly likely to belong to this category,
it seems reasonable to construe this as offering indirect support for the view that SCs, in general, may be less ideologically antagonistic towards
Muslims or Christians than upper castes or OBCs. A related issue is the motivation for participation. Our model predicts only that SCs will not
allocate resources to conflict with non-Hindus for normative/ideological, i.e., non-pecuniary, reasons. It is quite compatible with SCs acting as
mercenaries, i.e., selling their labor to upper castes or OBCs, in exchange for monetary/material payment, to be used by the latter in conflicts with
non-Hindus. Though we abstract from such market purchases of ‘activist labor’, analyzed by Esteban and Ray (2011), they can be built into our
analysis, at the cost of a major increase in algebraic complexity. They qualify our comparative static conclusions regarding changes in community
endowments, by bringing in both income and substitution effects of consequent changes in the price of mercenary labor, but do not necessarily
negate them. Similar considerations apply to SCs engaging in direct conflict with non-Hindus over expropriation of pecuniary resources from the
latter. Such expropriation is better analyzed via the theoretical model developed by Mitra and Ray (2014) in the context of Hindu-Muslim conflict,
which we discuss in detail in Section 3.3 below.
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vs. external conflict framework. However, as already discussed, the two modelling strategies yield identical implications in terms of
empirically testable comparative static hypotheses.
(iv) One can add another layer to the model by including contestation between upper castes and OBCs over norms, resources, or
both. While this greatly increases the algebraic complexity of the exposition, it adds nothing substantive to comparative static
insights. When upper castes are resource-weak relative to OBCs, they would free-ride on the OBCs in the contestation against the
SCs, as in our benchmark model. A marginal redistribution of resources from the OBCs to the upper castes would then force the
OBCs to shift resources from the contestation over untouchability to the contest against the upper castes, even as the upper
castes continue to free-ride on the OBCs against the SCs. The equilibrium SC share of the caste good would rise in consequence.
The opposite would happen when the upper castes resource-dominate the OBCs. Thus, we would get the same inverted Ushaped relationship between upper caste resource endowment relative to that of the OBCs and the equilibrium SC share of the
caste good that our benchmark model yields without any explicit upper caste – OBC conflict (Proposition 2(iii)). The other
comparative static implications stated in Proposition 2 would continue to hold as well.
(v) We have abstracted from the issue of internal coordination within communities by modelling them as individuals. Nothing of
substance depends on this. One can alternatively specify a fully decentralized version of the model, where community i ∈
{S, U, B, M} consists of Li individuals, each endowed with ρi amount of resources. In this version, all individuals k would
simultaneously choose their individual allocations as the solution to the problem defined by (3.1)-(3.5), with community
resource ρi replaced by individual resource ρi in the budget constraint, collective material consumption ni replaced by indi
vidual material consumption nik , and total community expenditure on either form of conflict defined simply as the sum of
community members’ individual contributions. It can then be shown that in the decentralized symmetric Nash equilibrium,
individual consumption bundles will depend only on the quadruple of community resource endowments ρS , ρU , ρB , ρM , with ρi
defined as Li ρi for every community i. The comparative static conclusions, as summarized by Proposition 2, remain unchanged.
Thus, the assumption of perfect coordination within communities made in our benchmark model serves to drastically simplify
the exposition, but our comparative static conclusions are robust to its replacement by the assumption of fully decentralized,
individual-level, decision-making. It is not even necessary that individual resource endowments be uniform within a com
munity, only that they be sufficiently similar to make all community members contribute a positive amount to at least one
contest, if at least one community member does so.
3.3. Two related contributions
At this stage, it is helpful to locate our theoretical structure and findings with respect to two recent contributions to the literature on
group conflict in India that are germane to our analysis.
Mitra and Ray (2014) lay out a two-group model in which aggressors in each group can initiate a conflict with victims in the other
group. In their model, essentially a variation on the ‘paradox of power’ identified by Hirshleifer (1991), a balanced increase in the
incomes of a group leads to unambiguously higher levels of attacks being perpetrated against them. This happens because the benefit
from attacking them increases, either because there is more to gain financially, or because the psychic value of expropriating them
increases. An increase in incomes, in contrast, reduces attacks perpetrated by that group, because the opportunity cost of time
expended on violence (instead of production) increases. In our model, an increase in resources, by reducing the marginal utility from
material consumption, reduces the opportunity cost of aggression, thereby increasing it. Intuitively, an increase in the income of a
group, say, M, may be expected to have a positive income effect on aggression by M, due to a diminution in the marginal utility of
material consumption, as well as a negative substitution effect, due to an increase in the opportunity cost of time allocated to
aggression. By assuming expropriation gains and violence cost to be perfect substitutes, through their linear cost-benefit structure for
aggression decisions, Mitra and Ray (2014) eliminate the income effect. The implicit assumption of perfect substitutability between
labour and non-labour inputs in the conflict technology allows our model to eliminate the substitution effect, so as to concentrate on
the income effect. At an intuitive level, their structure is more applicable to aggression against individually held property (‘money’),
while ours seems more relevant for aggression over public goods which are strictly normal in the standard sense. We believe collective
behavioural norms and religious consumption are indeed better theorized in the second way. Since, in our formulation, the net
valuation of aggression depends only on own income, income gain by either group does not, by itself, lead to greater aggression against
them. Of course, since such income gain makes the gainer group more aggressive, retaliatory violence by their opponents may rise as a
second order effect. These considerations open up the following possibility.
Remark 3. As a community, say M, gets richer, it may become more aggressive (or more powerful) in normative or behavioural
matters, as predicted by our model (Remark 2), even as it comes to suffer greater aggression against property holdings of its individual
members, as predicted by the model in Mitra and Ray (2014). There is no conceptual contradiction in being aggressors in one sphere
and, at the same time, victims in another. Both outcomes can occur together in a more general model. In reality, aggressive assertion in
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the symbolic-normative sphere often acts as the immediate trigger for property violence against both Muslims and SCs. Conversely,
property violence against Muslim or SC individuals often sets off longer-term processes of collective mobilization and identity assertion
by their respective communities.19
Mitra and Ray (2014) find a positive association between Muslim per-capita expenditure and Hindu-Muslim riots. A rise in the
resource endowment of Muslims (i.e., in ρM ) must increase the total resource expenditure on religious conflict in our model when
Hindus dominate Muslims. Thus, their empirical findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of our model. A rise in the Muslim
resource base reduces both caste conflict and the practice of untouchability in our model (phenomena not addressed at all in their
analysis), even as it increases religious conflict (as in theirs).
Using district level official data on crimes against SCs and STs and per capita consumption expenditures as a proxy for material
standard of living, Sharma (2015) finds the incidence, of crimes by non-SC/ST perpetrators against SC/ST individuals, to be positively
correlated with the ratio of expenditures of lower castes and tribes to that of upper castes. This relationship is however significant only
for violent ‘non-body’ (i.e., property) crimes. Thus, the relative economic position of SCs/STs has a significant association only with
crimes against them by non-SC/STs that are both violent and have the objective of expropriating economic surplus from the victims. As
already discussed (recall Remark 3 and footnote 19), there is no conceptual contradiction between SCs becoming more assertive in
normative or behavioural matters as their collective resource base improves (as in our model), and, at the same time, suffering more
attempts at material expropriation from upper castes or OBCs, as is suggested by the findings of Sharma (2015). The estimated cor
relation between relative SC/ST per capita consumption expenditure and crimes against SCs/STs by non-SC/STs registered under
Special and Local Laws (SLL), which are largely non-violent untouchability related offences with the intention of humiliating members
of the lower castes, is not significant. Even if we assume more SLL crimes implies more extensive practice of untouchability (thereby
ignoring the important caveats discussed in footnote 20), this insignificance by itself does not create any major intuitive or inter
pretative problems for us. This is because the numerical strength of SCs/STs, measured by their population share, has a significant
negative correlation with SLL crimes against them perpetrated by members of other communities (Sharma 2015;Table 2), as well as
non-SLL crimes against both their property and their bodies (Sharma 2015;Table 4). Hence, consistent with our theoretical conclusion,
Sharma’s empirical findings do lend themselves to the suggestion that greater relative SC community power will reduce the prevalence
of untouchability, provided the relative numerical strength of SCs is included in some fashion in the measure of their community power.
Average SC consumption/income/wealth may not be an appropriate measure of SC power because it does not capture the population
size effect. In our empirical analysis in Section 4, we shall accordingly include both its aggregate land share and its population share as
determinants of a community’s resource endowment, or power, instead of using its average land holding.20
3.4. Operationalizing the model
We now proceed to impose additional structure on our model, in order to make its comparative static implications (Proposition 2)
open to empirical scrutiny.
The first step involves the construction of an empirical measure for our theoretical variable gST , which would capture the propensity
of upper caste and OBC individuals to practise untouchability. How do village norms arrived at through group contestation affect
individual practice of untouchability on part of upper castes and OBCs? We assume that all H (i.e., upper caste and OBC) individuals j
take village norms governing the extent of tolerance of untouchability, modelled parsimoniously as the equilibrium value of (1 − gST ),
as given and act so as to maximize their utility, given by:
(3.10)

Vj = vj − K(gST )

where vj is the idiosyncratic benefit from practising untouchability. The idiosyncratic benefit vj is distributed according to some
⌣

⌣

⌣

⌣

distribution function H(vj ) defined over support [0,v]. H(vj ) is continuous and differentiable over (0,v), so that 0 ≤ H(0) < 1, H(v) = 1
19

In conformity with our model, increasing prosperity among Muslims in Kerala, for example, is widely perceived as having been associated with
radical Islamist assertion. The Popular Front of India, the primary political face of this assertion, stands accused of numerous acts of violence,
including murder. Emmerich (2020) provides an extensive discussion of this organization, and, more generally, of Muslim-identitarian political
assertion in India. For an overview of SC assertion and mobilization, as well as retaliatory violence by other castes, see Pai (2013).
20
Reporting issues may lead to only a weak correlation between reported SLL crimes and the actual prevalence of untouchability. SC/ST victims of
crimes perpetrated by members of other communities may feel emboldened to report such crimes to a greater extent when the latter are, on average,
less wealthy and thus less able to inflict punishment. Police officers may be more likely to register complaints by SC/ST victims against upper caste
or OBC individuals when the perpetrator community cannot offer large bribes, and/or the victim community can do so. For both reasons, an increase
in the per capita consumption of SCs/STs relative to that of upper castes need not reduce the number of crimes against SCs/STs recorded in official
statistics even when the total number of such crimes actually goes down. Thus, the statistical insignificance reported by Sharma (2015) does not
suffice to rule out a significantly negative relationship between the relative per capita consumption of SC/ST individuals and the true incidence of
untouchability. Another major caveat has to do with the offenses included under SLL crimes. While many of such offenses do appear directly related
to untouchability, some, such as wrongfully occupying SC/ST land/premises, compelling them to provide bonded/forced labour, etc., involve
material expropriation (of land or residential property, and labour, respectively) rather than untouchability per se. Sharma includes such property
crimes within her SLL aggregate, which makes it difficult to interpret that aggregate strictly as a (necessarily) robust measure of the prevalence of
untouchability-related practices.
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and H (vj ) > 0. Notice that we permit part of the non-SC Hindu population to derive no benefit from practising untouchability. K(gST )
specifies the cost of practising untouchability. The greater the value of gST , the lower the collective tolerance of untouchability, hence
′
the greater the cost to upper caste and OBC individuals from its practice. We therefore assume K(0) = 0, K > 0 and K(1) ≤ v. It is then
clear from (3.10) that the proportion of the upper caste and OBC population within the village that will practise untouchability (i.e., its
incidence within the H community) is given by:
⌣

(3.11)

μ = 1 − H (K(gST )) ≡ μ(gST );
⌣

with [1 ≥ μ(0) = 1 − H(0) > 0] and μ (gST ) < 0. The variable μ can be alternatively interpreted as the probability that a randomly
chosen non-SC Hindu member of the village will engage in the practice. Note that a positive proportion of the H population may not
practise untouchability even if it is costless to do so. The proportion of the H population not practising untouchability increases as the
′

⌣

SC bloc attains greater success in the caste conflict. We assume that the distribution function H(vj ) is identical across all villages.
Furthermore, since our data-set provides household level (rather than individual level) responses, we ignore differences in household
size and assume that all members of a household value the benefits from practising untouchability equally. The theoretical conclusions
presented in Proposition 2 can then be empirically investigated by examining the relationship between μ, interpreted as the likelihood
(probability) that a randomly chosen H household will practise untouchability, which is observable in our data-set (rather than gST ,
which is not), and empirical proxies for the model parameters ρS , ρM , ρH and θ specified for the village inhabited by this particular
household.
Our next step in making the model empirically operational therefore involves defining empirical proxies for the four model pa
rameters, namely, the community resource endowments ρS , ρM and ρH , and the upper caste share of non-SC Hindu resource endowment
θ. Denote the land endowment of community i by δi and its labour endowment by Li . We specify the community resource production
function as having the symmetric Cobb-Douglas functional form: ρi = A(δi Li )ω , with A, ω > 0, for every community i ∈ {S,M,H}. Since
ρi is then strictly increasing in δi Li , this permits us to use δi Li as the empirical measure of community power for SCs, non-Hindus and the
(
)
′
combined upper caste and OBC Hindu bloc. Furthermore, we assume that: θ ≡ ρρU = ̂
θ δδHU LLUH , with ̂
θ(0) = 0, ̂
θ(1) = 1 and ̂
θ > 0 for
H
(
)
(
)
every δδHU LLUH ∈ (0,1). Hence, we can use the ratio δδHU LLUH as the empirical proxy for the parameter θ – as the empirical measure of the
extent of dominance of upper castes within the non-SC Hindu community (H) in terms of share of community resources.
Lastly, we need to make the model scale-neutral for empirical application, since our data-set only provides information regarding
the population proportions and land shares of the various communities within a village, not the aggregate population size or total land
holding. It can be easily seen from Proposition 1 that this happens under the additional assumption F(ni ) ≡ lnni . Given θ, any equiproportionate change in the community resource endowments ρM , ρS and ρH will leave the equilibrium shares unchanged under
this additional assumption. In confronting the predictions of our theoretical model with the empirical evidence, we will deploy this
scale-neutral version. Since [A(ℏδi Li )ω = (ℏ)ω A(δi Li )ω ] for all ℏ > 0, any equi-proportionate change, ℏ, in the population weighted land
endowments of S, M and H must change the community resource endowments ρM , ρS and ρH by the same proportion (ℏ)ω . Hence, the
scale-neutral version of our model, when combined with our Cobb-Douglas specification of the community resource function, implies
that only the land and population shares of the communities S, M and H matter for community power, not the total land or population
endowment of the village as a whole.
The additional assumptions imposed on the model discussed above make Proposition 2 fully open to empirical scrutiny, which we
shall attempt in Section 4 below.
4. Empirical strategy and findings
We now proceed to test the predictions of our theoretical model, as summarized by Proposition 2 and operationalized via the
additional assumptions introduced in Section 3.4. We consider IHDS 2012 rural household-level data, focusing on Hindu non-SC/ST
households, to conform to our model. This yields a sample of about 13,000 non-SC/ST Hindu households drawn from about 1100
villages in our estimation sample. Note that the rural IHDS 2012 data is most representative at the household level. We do not seek
evidence for either the predictions regarding the outcome of the religious conflict, or those regarding conflict intensities and
participation patterns, generated by our theoretical analysis, due to the limitations of our data set.
4.1. Empirical strategy
The key driver of untouchability in our model is a community’s relative power. Define ri = (δi Li ). As discussed in Section 3.4, for
each village in our sample, the resource base or power of community H, i.e., of the combined Brahmin, Forward and OBC caste bloc, ρH ,
is empirically proxied by the variable rH : the population share of H households in that village multiplied by the proportion of the total
village land owned by H households therein. For example, if 50% of the population in the village belong to the H category, and H
households collectively own 70% of the village land, then the variable rH will be ascribed a value of 0.35 for that village. This measure
will in general vary across villages. Resource endowments of SCs and non-Hindus, as captured respectively by the variables ρS and ρM
in our theoretical model, are proxied analogously, by their respective population shares in the village multiplied by their respective
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Table 3
Key explanatory variables at the village-level - definitions and summary statistics.
Variable
U
B
H
S
M
U_H
U_landsh
B_landsh
H_landsh
S_landsh
M_landsh
U_H_landsh

ρH
ρS
ρM
θ

Definition
Village population shares
Brahmin and Forward population share
OBC population share
(U + B)
SC population share
Muslim plus Christian population share
U/ H
Village land shares
Land share held by Brahmins and Forwards
Land share held by OBCs
(U_landsh + B_landsh)
Land share held by SCs
Land share held by Muslims and Christians
U_landsh/H_landsh
Key explanatory variables: Measures of community power
H*H landsh

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

1184
1183
1183
1183
1203
1178

0.255177
0.435567
0.690935
0.212466
0.084289
0.280941

0.267787
0.283303
0.225737
0.169005
0.164987
0.317399

1115
1115
1115
1115
1215
1095

0.309327
0.409031
0.718359
0.107955
0.169951
0.419251

0.317604
0.31455
0.248308
0.14163
0.318693
0.382122

1104

0.535175

0.259125

S*S landsh

1104

0.039095

0.097658

M*M landsh

1203

0.033759

0.109802

(U *U landsh)/(H *H landsh)

1085

0.2661485

0.3323376

Other village-level control variables X, Z
Distance from the nearest town (km)
Has outside workers
Has all-weather road
Has government primary school
Has private primary school
More developed village
SC Pradhan in a reserved GP
Pradhan is a female

1206
1215
1215
1215
1215
1215
1215
1215

13.52322
0.548148
0.878189
0.981893
0.412346
0.472428
0.026337
0.403292

10.53336
0.497881
0.327202
0.133393
0.49246
0.4994448
0.1602027
0.4907605

shares of total village land.21 The variable θ is empirically proxied by the ratio rrUH (recall the discussion in Section 3.4). Thus, we shall
identify ρi with its empirically measurable proxy ri (where i ∈ {H, S, M}), and θ with

rU
rH ,

in our empirical analysis. We include only

Muslims and Christians in the non-Hindu category, dropping the other religious minorities due to their numerical insignificance and
localized presence.22
Agricultural land in India is largely held within families and therefore within castes. The land market is generally inactive in Indian
villages (Mearns, 1999). The land shares held by different caste-based communities can therefore be considered relatively stable over
time. Population shares of different communities are also relatively stable over time (Bharti, 2018). We therefore treat our key
explanatory variables, i.e., the community’s population share weighted land shares, as exogenous to determining the likelihood of
untouchability in our sample.
Our key outcome variable is whether members of rural households belonging to the H group exercise untouchability. Accordingly,
we determine the likelihood (probability) of the ith household belonging to the H group practising untouchability as follows:
(Eq. 1)

Pij = α0 + α1 ρHj + α2 ρSj + α3 ρMj + α4 Σk θjk + aXij + uij

where the subscript j refers to the village inhabited by that particular household i. Our key explanatory variables are the group power of
non-SC/ST Hindus, SCs and non-Hindus as captured respectively by ρH , ρS , and ρM , along with the degree of upper caste dominance
within the non-SC/ST Hindu bloc, captured by θ, all referring to the particular village j inhabited by the ith household. These variables
are identified for empirical purposes with rH , rS , rM and rrHU respectively (see Table 3). We include θk, k = 1,2,3, to capture the non-

monotone relationship between θ and an H household practising untouchability. In particular, we use the decile distribution of θ to
generate the following dummy variables: θ1 refers to the values of θ in the first 2 deciles; θ2 to values of θ between 7 and 9 th deciles and
θ3 to those for the 10th decile values of θ. Therefore the 3rd to 6th deciles act as our reference category. In Section 4.2.3 below, we
check the robustness of this specification by replacing the linear splines of θ by a quadratic function, as an alternative way of searching
for a non-monotone relationship between P and θ.
We include a vector of control variables X to minimise the potential omitted variable bias of our estimates. The set X includes the

21

We also have information on income and expenditure of the households. But we prefer land ownership as a measure of resource base since its
historically given character minimises the likelihood of reverse causality. As noted earlier (footnote 6), our measure of a community’s resource
endowment is closely linked to the notion of a ‘dominant’ caste, as introduced by Srinivas (1955).
22
According the latest (2011) Indian Population Census, Sikhs, Jains, Parsees and Buddhists collectively constitute only about 3.5% of the Indian
population. At 1.7% of the population, Sikhs make up about half of this group, but they are a negligible proportion of the population in every state
except Punjab, where about 80% of them live, accounting for about 60% of that state’s population.
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Table 3A
Outcome and control variables at the household-level - definitions and summary statistics.
Variable
Abbreviations
Untouchability
hh_brahmin
hh_FC
hh_OBC
head_geclass5
prim_cult
prim_lab
prim_bus
prim_artisan

Definition
Outcome variable
Practice of untouchability by Hindu upper castes (non-SC/ST households)
Other control variables
Household Brahmin
Household forward caste
Household OBC
Head has at least class 5 education
Primary occp: cultivation
Primary occp:labour
Primary occp:business
Primary occp: artisan

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

14,031

0.340033

0.473737

14,044
14,044
14,044
14,044
14,044
14,044
14,044
14,044

0.07804
0.253916
0.652806
0.233837
0.465323
0.269581
0.077257
0.010752

0.268245
0.435266
0.476095
0.423285
0.498814
0.443758
0.267009
0.103136

village’s distance from the nearest town, the presence of outside workers, all-weather roads as well as government and private primary
schools. Closeness to a town, good connectivity or the presence of outside workers in a village may enhance villagers’ exposure to
urban values or other cultures, which in turn may influence the practice of untouchability. Education may, potentially, act as an
influence against caste-based discrimination. Furthermore, we include a number of household characteristics: (a) if the household head
has at least grade 5 schooling, (b) if the household is Brahmin, Forward caste or OBC, and (c) whether the primary occupation of the
household is cultivation, labour, business or artisanal work.
Since our key explanatory variables - the ρs and the θs - are village-level, we cannot include village dummies in the regressions. However, we
include district dummies in the control vector X. States and union territories in India are subdivided into districts headed by a civil servant
known as District Magistrate. District authorities are responsible for local spending on education, culture, poverty reduction and family
welfare. Accordingly, district dummies would account for the unobserved time-invariant district-level variation in local governance that may
also influence the outcome of interest.23 By including them, we can exploit the variation in the practice of untouchability by H households
within a district, thereby minimising the influence of inter-district unobserved heterogeneity in our estimates.
To test the robustness of estimates of Equation 1 in the cross-section of villages, we also include additional controls that may
influence the likelihood of untouchability and therefore would help minimising the omitted variable bias of our estimates from
Equation (1) further. To this end, we include three binary variables, namely, if the Pradhan is SC and elected in reserved GP; if the
Pradhan is a female and also if the village is more developed. The 73rd Amendment of the Indian Constitution introduced in 1993
requires that a fraction of seats of the village councils, or ‘gram panchayats’ (GP) at all levels be reserved for SCs. Since we observe
whether the Pradhan (Head of the village council) is an SC elected from a reserved GP in our data, we include it as an additional control
to check the robustness of our results. The underlying idea is that, having an SC Pradhan in a GP may improve the collective power of
SCs, which in turn may reduce untouchability.24 Similarly, we construct a second binary variable indicating if the Pradhan is female, in
order to see whether reservation for women in GPs matters for local households practising untouchability. Inclusion of SC Pradhan and
female Pradhan in a reserved GP, together, would allow us to assess the beneficial role of affirmative action, if any. Finally, IHDS data
allow us to demarcate more developed villages from less developed ones. To this end, we include a third binary variable that takes the
value 1 if it is a more developed village; it is zero otherwise. More developed villages may experience market-led development, which
in turn may weaken or exacerbate caste inequalities (Mosse, 2018). Inclusion of these three additional variables leads us to estimate
specification 2, where the set of augmented control variables is represented by Z, as follows:
′

Pij = β0 + β1 ρHj + β2 ρSj + β3 ρMj + β4 Σk θjk + βR Reserved + β Zij + uij .

(Eq. 2)

In Equation (2), the binary variable Reserved indicates the presence of an SC Pradhan in a reserved GP; the set Z includes all
variables in X plus female Pradhan and more developed village.
Finally, we explore whether the presence of an SC Pradhan in a reserved GP allows us to isolate its differential impact on un
touchability via its effect on the ρ and θ variables. To this end, we interact the binary variable Reserved with all the ρ and θ variables to
further augment Equation (2) as follows:
Pij

=

δ0 + δ1 ρHj + δ2 ρSj + δ3 ρMj + δ4k Σk θjk + δR Reserved + δ5 ρHj XReserved
′
+ δ6 ρSj XReserved + δ7 ρMj XReserved + δ8k Σk θjk XReserved + δ Zij + uij

(Eq. 3)

We estimate Equations (1)-(3) using household-level data, since IHDS data is most representative at the household-level. As
indicated earlier, we do not generate household level estimates with village fixed effects. This is because our key explanatory variables

23
Due to the limitations of IHDS data, we cannot incorporate such dummies at local administrative levels situated between the district and the
village.
24
This is suggested by findings that electoral reservation for SCs may have positive consequences for them. Chauchard (2014) offers causal ev
idence that reservations for SCs in GPs affect the psychology of members of other castes, leading to a decrease in their discriminatory intentions
against SCs. Girard (2018) finds that such SC quotas in GPs reduce the likelihood of exclusion of SCs from the use of public roads while in operation,
though not permanently. Mukherjee et al. (2020) show that in reserved GPs with SC Pradhans, location clusters of SC households receive higher
allocations for the provision of metalled road and road-repair activities by the GP.
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Table 4
OLS household-level estimates of untouchability by Hindu rural non-SC/ST households using linear splines of θ.
With district FE

ρH
ρM
ρS
θ: decile 1 & 2
θ: decile 7–9
θ: decile 10
Household brahmin
Household FC
Household_OBC
HH head has at least primary sch
Primary occp: cultivation
Primary occp: labour
Primary occp: business
Primarly occp: artisan
Distance from nearest town
Outside workers
Pucca road
Has a govt. primary sch
Has a pvt primary sch
Pradhan SC Reserved
Pradhan female
More developed village

ρH xPradhan SC reserved

Mean (sd)(1)
0.3691

Equation 1
(2)
0.1392***

Equation 2
(3)
0.1376***

Equation 3
(4)
0.1324***

(0.4156)
0.0184

(9.10)
− 0.2748***

(9.01)
− 0.2667***

(8.53)
− 0.2609***

(0.0712)
0.0287

(5.68)
− 0.2262***

(5.47)
− 0.2557***

(5.29)
− 0.2466***

(0.0637)
0.2440
(0.4295)
0.1667
(0.3727)
0.0847
(0.2785)
0.078
(0.2682)
0.2539
(0.4352)
0.6528
(0.4760)
0.2338
(0.4232)
0.4653
(0.4988)
0.2696
(0.4437)
0.0772
(0.2670)
0.0107
(0.1031)
13.44
(10.1077)
0.5432
(0.4981)
0.8773
(0.3280)
0.9806
(0.1378)
0.3897
(0.4877)
0.023
(0.1488)
0.400
(0.489)
0.446
(0.4971)

(6.73)
− 0.0401***
(4.96)
− 0.0310***
(3.18)
0.0565***
(3.95)
0.2162***
(9.49)
0.1098***
(5.57)
0.0960***
(5.13)
0.0011
(0.15)
0.0069
(0.76)
− 0.0170*
(1.73)
− 0.0039
(0.29)
0.0033
(0.10)
0.0014***
(4.27)
− 0.0198***
(2.85)
− 0.0468***
(4.29)
− 0.0313
(1.10)
− 0.0047
(0.68)

(7.44)
− 0.0395***
(4.89)
− 0.0209**
(2.15)
0.0582***
(4.09)
0.2028***
(9.03)
0.1016***
(5.22)
0.0898***
(4.87)
0.0029
(0.39)
0.0014
(0.15)
− 0.0177*
(1.81)
− 0.0011
(0.08)
0.0119
(0.36)
0.0015***
(4.69)
− 0.0081
(1.16)
− 0.0222**
(1.99)
− 0.0268
(0.94)
0.0162**
(2.26)
0.0181
(0.83)
0.0329***
(4.96)
− 0.0777***
(10.41)

(6.69)
− 0.0386***
(4.73)
− 0.0193**
(1.96)
0.0554***
(3.82)
0.2033***
(9.01)
0.1035***
(5.29)
0.0903***
(4.87)
0.0027
(0.36)
0.0004
(0.04)
− 0.0175*
(1.79)
− 0.0007
(0.05)
0.0120
(0.36)
0.0015***
(4.54)
− 0.0068
(0.98)
− 0.0240**
(2.14)
− 0.0267
(0.94)
0.0174**
(2.41)
− 0.1227***
(3.01)
0.0324***
(4.89)
− 0.0797***
(10.64)
0.4609***
(4.68)
− 0.5959***

ρM xPradhan SC reserved

(2.84)
0.0763

ρS xPradhan SC reserved
θ: decile 1 & 2xPradhan SC reserved
θ: decile 7–9x Pradhan SC reserved
θ: decile 10x Pradhan SC reserved
Intercept

0.1138***
(2.76)
Yes
0.10
12,760

District FE
R2
N

0.1096***
(2.66)
Yes
0.11
12,760

(0.66)
− 0.0576
(1.10)
− 0.0715
(1.18)
0.1387**
(2.08)
0.1126***
(2.73)
Yes
0.11
12,760

Note: The table shows the household level estimates of untouchability amongst non-SC/ST rural Hindu households. The outcome variable pertains to
the household response to TR4A: it takes a value 1 if some household members practise untouchability; it is zero otherwise. Columns (2)-(4)
respectively show OLS estimates of untouchability for Equations 1–3, using the joint distribution of population and land shares as a measure of
community power; these estimates include district fixed effects. Each equation also controls for other factors including if the household is Brahmin,
Forward caste, OBC, if the household head has at least five years of schooling, if the household’s primary occupation is cultivation, labour, business,
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artisan, distance of the village from town, if outside workers come to this village, village’s access to pucca road, government and private primary
schools. We use robust standard errors. T-statistics are shown in the parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

pertain to village-level community power in terms of ρs and θs,amongst other village-level controls. These village-level variables lose
variation within a village and sometimes drop out of the regression. This is most likely to happen in estimating Equation (3) that
includes a number of interactions with the presence of an SC Pradhan in a reserved GP, thus producing inconsistent results.
All village-level regression variables are defined in Table 3, which also summarises their descriptive statistics. We show the
community level means and standard deviations of population and land shares in Table 3 as well. This highlights the fact that a
community’s land share is not exactly proportional to its population share within a village, thus justifying the use of population
weighted land share as the relevant measure of community power in our analysis. The means and standard deviations of householdlevel regression variables are provided in Table 3A.
4.2. Empirical findings – household-level estimates
In light of Proposition 2, under the maintained assumptions introduced in Section 3.4, we test the following hypotheses: (a) in
Equation 1, α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 < 0; and (b) the likelihood of an H household practising untouchability falls at low values of θ, but rises at
high values of θ. Hypothesis (a) is an implication of our central idea, micro-founded by Proposition 2((i) and (ii)), that any village-level
increase in the power of SCs or non-Hindus, and any village-level decrease in the power of non-SC Hindus, must all be associated with a
lower likelihood of H households practising untouchability. We include dummies to represent different deciles of θ meant to
approximate its non-monotone impact on untouchability, as micro-founded by Proposition 2(iii) and posited by hypothesis (b) above,
and test whether the marginal effect is negative when θ is close to 0, but positive when θ is close to 1.
4.2.1. Estimates using linear splines of θ
Household-level estimates with district dummies are summarised in Table 4. Column (1) shows the means and standard deviations
of key explanatory variables. Columns (2)-(4) show the household-level estimates with district fixed effects respectively for Equations
(1)-(3). These estimates explain the variation in the likelihood of an H household practising untouchability within a district in our rural
sample. The likelihood of a rural H household practising untouchability within a district appears to be correlated not only with internal
characteristics of that household or aggregate characteristics of the village where the household resides, but, crucially, with the
distribution of resources amongst the main communities within that village (and therefore by its communal power structure) as well, in
ways predicted by our model.
Column (2) shows that, ceteris paribus, greater power of non-Hindus (largely Muslims) or SCs within the village (i.e., higher ρM or
ρS ) is associated with a lower likelihood of upper caste and OBC households practising untouchability therein (Proposition 2(i)) – the
estimated coefficients are both negative and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for ρH is positive and statistically sig
nificant. Thus, greater power of non-SC/ST Hindus within the village is associated with a higher likelihood of such households
practising untouchability (Proposition 2(ii)).
Our theoretical model also predicts the following: given ρH , ρM and ρS , increases in the collective power of upper castes vis-à-vis
OBCs (i.e., in the variable θ) will have non-monotone effects on untouchability (Proposition 2(iii)). As discussed earlier, we use the
decile distribution of θ to check for such an empirical relationship in our sample, and use the 3rd to 6th deciles as our reference
category. As predicted by our model, we find a U-shaped relationship between θ and the propensity of H households to practise un
touchability: the estimated coefficient of deciles 1 and 2 together is negative and statistically significant while that of decile 10 is
positive and statistically significant. Thus, these estimates are consistent with our hypotheses.
As expected in light of our preliminary analysis (Table 2), we find Brahmin households within the H bloc to be associated with a
higher likelihood of practising untouchability within that bloc. Forward caste and OBC households appear to behave similarly with
regard to untouchability. However, the education level of the head of the household and most occupations (with the exception of
labour) appear not to bear any significant association with the likelihood of an H household practising untouchability. Labouring H
households are less likely to practise untouchability in our sample though the effect is only weakly significant at 10% level. The
closeness of a village to the nearest town, and the presence of pucca (all-weather) roads, which may both indicate a greater exposure to
urban value systems, are associated with significantly lower likelihood of untouchability. However, the presence of primary schools
within the village, whether public or private, does not appear to make a significant difference.
Would the conclusions change if, instead of population share weighted land shares, we took the land share alone or the population
share alone or their ratio, i.e., the normalized per capita land share,25 as the measure of community power? Table 6 in Appendix B
shows the corresponding estimates using Equation (1). It is evident that none of the three alternative empirical proxies for community
power generates estimates that are consistent with all our theoretical predictions.

25
The normalized per capita land share measure of community power falls as a community becomes numerically larger relative to its opponents.
This is a crude but simple way of capturing the idea, originally due to Olson (1965), that larger groups are less effective in conflicts with other
groups, because of greater internal free-riding and collective action problems. In this case, θ would be empirically measured by the normalized per
capita land share of U expressed as a proportion of the normalized per capita land share of H.
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Table 4A
Oster test for reservation variables for Equation (2).
Pradhan SC Reserved
Pradhan female

Beta
0.0181
0.0329

Beta when delta=0
0.01808
0.03286

Beta when delta=1
0.01810
0.03286

Beta when delta=0.75
0.01809
0.03286

Beta when delta=1.25
0.01810
0.03286

Note: The table tests the stability of the treatment effects (a la Oster, 2017) of Pradhan SC Reserved and Pradhan Female for varying values of relative
degree of selection as proxied by delta. We calculate a range of bias adjusted beta values for the selected variables with varying delta=0, 1, 0.75, 1.25
where delta=1 means equal selection. These estimates remain remarkably stable, thus establishing the robustness of the estimates.

4.2.2. Robustness tests
Equation 2 estimates - Including additional controls. We now test the robustness of our baseline estimates of Equation (1) by estimating
Equation (2) which includes three additional controls, namely, if the Pradhan is SC and elected in a reserved GP, if the Pradhan is
female and also if it is a more developed village. Column (3) of Table 4 confirms the robustness of our key estimates (i.e., those
pertaining to the ρ and θ variables) presented in column (2). Having villages with an SC Pradhan in a reserved GP appears not to matter
for untouchability - the estimated coefficient of the new dummy variable SC Pradhan in a reserved GP is positive but statistically
insignificant. The insignificance is probably due to the fact that only about 2.6% of village Pradhans in our sample are in SC reserved
GPs. Presence of female Pradhan appears to be associated with higher untouchability. This is not surprising since 99% of these female
Pradhans are non-SC.26 Higher level of development of the village is associated with lower untouchability.
We also conducted the Oster (2017) test for coefficient stability with respect to the variables Pradhan SC in a reserved GP and
Pradhan female, both of which capture affirmative action measures launched by the government of India. Table 4A establishes the
relative stability of the treatment effects of Pradhan SC Reserved and Pradhan Female for varying values of the relative degree of
selection as proxied by delta. We calculated a range of bias adjusted beta values for the selected variables with varying delta=0, 1,
0.75, 1.25 where delta=1 means equal selection. These estimates remain remarkably stable, thus establishing the robustness of these
treatment effects with respect to Pradhan SC in a reserved GP and also Pradhan female.
Equation 3 estimates: including interactions with SC Pradhan Reserved. Column (4) of Table 4 shows the estimates as per Equation (3),
which includes interactions of the key explanatory variables with the binary variable SC Pradhan Reserved. The estimated coefficient
of SC Pradhan Reserved now turns negative and statistically significant. The non-interacted estimates of ρs and θs remain similar to our
baseline estimates in column (2) implying that untouchability in villages without reservation for an SC Pradhan is consistent with the
predictions of our theoretical model. The interacted estimates tend to be largely insignificant, though they have the appropriate sign
when statistically significant.
In sum, the estimates presented in Table 4 are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, irrespective of the regression
specification chosen.
4.2.3. Estimates using quadratic θ
We now re-estimate Equations 1–3 using a quadratic specification (a1 θ + a2 θ2 ) to capture the impact of the relative power of upper castes
vis-à-vis OBCs (proxied by the variable θ), instead of the linear spline specification deployed earlier. This offers an alternative way of testing
whether the U-shaped relationship between untouchability and θ predicted by our theoretical analysis is consistent with the data. This exercise
may therefore be intuitively viewed as an additional robustness test of the empirical patterns laid bare by our earlier investigation.
The corresponding estimates are presented in Table 5 below. Evidently, these estimates are consistent with all our conjectures
about ρs and θ. As before, the estimated coefficients of ρM and ρS are both negative and significant, while that for ρH is positive and
significant. Additionally, there is further confirmation of a U-shaped relationship between θ and the likelihood of an H household
practising untouchability. The estimated coefficient of θ is negative, while that of the square of θ is positive; both these estimated
coefficients are statistically significant. Furthermore, the absolute value of the former is lower than the latter. Hence, the estimated net
effect (on the likelihood of an H household practising untouchability) of a marginal increase in θ is negative when θ is below a
threshold value, but positive otherwise. The results from the corresponding Oster test are presented in Table 5A below – these are
qualitatively very similar to those presented in Table 4A.
Table 7 in Appendix B shows the corresponding estimates of Equation (1) using a quadratic fit for θ. As with Table 6, none of the
three alternative empirical proxies for community power generates estimates that are consistent with all of our theoretical predictions.
Since we have not carried out explicit causality tests, the empirical associations presented in this section do not allow us to draw any
strong inference regarding the direction of causality. We have hypothesised certain causal mechanisms in our theoretical model, and
deduced their implications for the relationship between the intra-village distribution of community resource endowments (or power)
and the incidence of untouchability. Our empirical analysis has unearthed statistically significant patterns in that relationship within
our data-set which are consistent with, and can therefore be explained or rationalized by, the operation of our hypothesised causal
mechanisms. These patterns however seem difficult to rationalize from any perspective that views a household’s decision to practise

26
This is why we have not interacted the Pradhan Female dummy with the key explanatory variables in Equation (3). But note that there are 32
villages with an SC Pradhan in a reserved GP of whom 5 are female.
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Table 5
OLS household-level estimates of untouchability by Hindu rural non-SC/ST households using quadratic fit for θ.
ρH
ρM
ρS
θ
θ2
Household brahmin
Household FC
Household_OBC
HH head has at least primary sch
Primary occp: cultivation
Primary occp: labour
Primary occp: business
Primarly occp: artisan
Distance from nearest town
Outside workers
Pucca road
Has a govt. primary sch
Has a pvt primary sch
Pradhan SC Reserved

Equation 1
0.1228***

Equation 2
0.1231***

Equation 3
0.1195***

(7.83)
− 0.2600***

(7.88)
− 0.2506***

(7.54)
− 0.2511***

(5.28)
− 0.2716***

(5.01)
− 0.3035***

(5.01)
− 0.2964***

(7.77)
− 0.1655***
(4.28)
0.2392***
(5.73)
0.2221***
(9.39)
0.1143***
(5.52)
0.1014***
(5.18)
0.0019
(0.25)
0.0064
(0.70)
− 0.0169*
(1.72)
− 0.0033
(0.25)
0.0042
(0.13)
0.0015***
(4.55)
− 0.0187***
(2.68)
− 0.0403***
(3.65)
− 0.0294
(1.04)
− 0.0028
(0.41)

(8.47)
− 0.1513***
(3.92)
0.2295***
(5.52)
0.2112***
(9.07)
0.1094***
(5.37)
0.0973***
(5.06)
0.0036
(0.48)
0.0011
(0.12)
− 0.0176*
(1.79)
0.0002
(0.01)
0.0141
(0.43)
0.0016***
(4.96)
− 0.0064
(0.92)
− 0.0143
(1.27)
− 0.0239
(0.84)
0.0192***
(2.68)
0.0242
(1.07)
0.0312***
(4.70)
− 0.0814***
(10.90)

(7.68)
− 0.1562***
(3.98)
0.2319***
(5.45)
0.2115***
(9.04)
0.1110***
(5.40)
0.0975***
(5.04)
0.0031
(0.41)
− 0.0003
(0.03)
− 0.0180*
(1.83)
− 0.0003
(0.02)
0.0138
(0.42)
0.0016***
(4.91)
− 0.0058
(0.82)
− 0.0138
(1.22)
− 0.0239
(0.84)
0.0198***
(2.76)
− 0.1885***
(4.94)
0.0309***
(4.66)
− 0.0832***
(11.12)
0.4260***

Pradhan female
More developed village

ρH xPradhan SC reserved

(4.10)
− 1.2625**

ρM xPradhan SC reserved

(2.06)
− 0.0728

ρS xPradhan SC reserved
θxPradhan SC reserved
θ2xPradhan SC reserved
Intercept
District FE
R2
N

0.1069***
(2.59)
Yes
0.09
12,715

0.0979**
(2.37)
Yes
0.10
12,715

(0.61)
0.4992**
(2.35)
− 0.2328
(1.22)
0.0971**
(2.34)
Yes
0.11
12,715

Note: The table shows the household level estimates of untouchability amongst non-SC/ST rural Hindu households with village fixed effects. In each
column, the outcome variable pertains to the household response to TR4A: it takes a value 1 if some household members practise untouchability; it is
zero otherwise. Columns (1)-(3) respectively show household-level OLS estimates of untouchability for Equations 1–3 with district fixed effects,
using the joint distribution of population and land shares as a measure of community power. Each specification also controls for other factors
including if the household head has at least five years of schooling, if the household’s primary occupation is cultivation, labour, business, artisan,
distance of the village from town, if outside workers come to this village, village’s access to pucca road, government and private primary schools. We
use robust standard errors. T-statistics are shown in the parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 5A
Oster test for household model with district FE for Equation (2) in Table 5.
Pradhan SC Reserved
Pradhan female

Beta
0.0242
0.0312

Beta when delta=0
0.02416
0.03117

Beta when delta=1
0.02416
0.03117

Beta when delta=0.75
0.02416
0.03117

Beta when delta=1.25
0.02416
0.03117

Note: The table tests the stability of the treatment effects (a la Oster, 2017) of Pradhan SC Reserved and Pradhan Female for varying values of relative
degree of selection as proxied by delta. We calculate a range of bias adjusted beta values for the selected variables with varying delta=0, 1, 0.75, 1.25
where delta=1 means equal selection. These estimates remain remarkably stable, thus establishing the robustness of the estimates.

untouchability as driven only by its own characteristics, independently of the intra-village distribution of land and population – of
power – across caste and religious groupings. Nonetheless, there may exist causal mechanisms and processes other than the ones
hypothesized in our theoretical model that rationalize the empirical associations between untouchability and community power
highlighted in this section as well as our model, or better. We cannot rule out their existence. As such, we view the empirical
investigation in this section as merely unearthing certain interesting patterns in our data-set which can be rationalized by our theo
retical framework, thereby attesting to the possible usefulness of the latter as a tool for organising further empirical research, rather
than as providing definitive evidence of any causal relationships.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper examines the possible role played by village-level community power in influencing the practice of untouchability amongst upper
and backward caste Hindus in rural India. In so doing, it identifies caste and religion as two identities prone to group conflict and offers
theoretical micro-foundations for the idea that the distribution of economic resources that define a community’s power shapes investment in
these conflicts. Using a parsimonious model of tripartite conflict, we have formalized the idea that a Hindu upper or backward caste house
hold’s propensity to practise untouchability vis-à-vis Hindu ‘scheduled’ castes is determined not solely by its own characteristics but, crucially,
also by the inter-group distribution of resources across both caste and religious divides. In our model, such inter-group resource distribution
affects the prevalence of untouchability via village-level conflicts over collective assertions of both caste and religious identities. Identifying a
community’s resource endowment (or power) with its population weighted land share, we have offered evidence consistent with the pre
dictions of our theoretical model, with regard to the association between community power and the incidence of untouchability, using rural
household-level data from the India Human Development Survey II – 2011–12. We find robust evidence of an increase in the power of either SCs
or Muslims/Christians, or a decrease in that of non-SC/ST Hindus, being associated with a statistically significant reduction in untouchability.
We also find robust evidence that a marginal increase in the power of upper castes in villages relative to that of OBCs is associated with a
significant reduction in untouchability at low levels of relative upper caste power, but a significant expansion at high levels. As far as we know,
ours is the first paper to foreground relative community power, empirically measured by the population weighted land distribution across
communities, as possibly a key determinant of the incidence of untouchability in rural India.
We have offered a theory of the joint determination of caste and religious conflicts. However, due to data constraints, we have
confined ourselves to examining only the outcome of caste conflict at an empirical level. Future work, using richer data-sets, whether
singly or in combination, may usefully examine empirical outcomes of both conflicts, as well as testing the predictions of the model
regarding conflict intensities and participation patterns. While our theoretical analysis hypothesizes a causal relationship between
community power and untouchability, our empirical analysis does not address the direction of causality. Future work may usefully
seek to develop theoretical frameworks that provide alternative rationalizations, and investigate whether they perform better than
ours in empirical applications. Outcomes of caste conflicts other than untouchability (our sole empirical focus in this paper), such as
market discrimination and differential contract enforcement, may constitute another avenue of application. Lastly, the practice of
untouchability in urban contexts – an issue we have left entirely unexamined – deserves investigation.
Our theoretical structure, with its foregrounding of collective political action and group power determined according to the intergroup distribution of material and human resources, can evidently be applied to the analysis of social discrimination across identity
divides in different country contexts. Much of the theoretical literature on ethnic group conflict focuses on modelling bilateral conflict.
Our analysis, in both its theoretical and empirical articulations, draws attention to the community power of ‘third parties’ such as Muslims
and Christians, as well as social cleavages between upper and backward caste Hindus, to explain much of the incidence of untouchability
in rural India. Analogous investigations, of how the power of one ethnic group affects social divisions and interactions within/amongst
other ethnic groups, may yield important insights. To illustrate, Nigeria has a long history of conflict between Muslims and Christians, the
latter being roughly three quarters Protestant and one quarter Catholic. Lebanon’s tortuous political history can be viewed as essentially a
process of contestation amongst Muslims more or less equally fragmented into Shias and Sunnis and Christians split into a Maronite
plurality and a large Greek Orthodox minority, alongside numerous other smaller groups. Sunni Muslims in Syria are further divided into
Kurds and Arabs, while Alawites and Christians constitute large minorities, alongside smaller groups. Social conflict in Iraq has often been
driven by a contestation between Kurds and Arabs, with the latter antagonistically fragmented into Shia and Sunni blocks. In all these,
historically conflict-prone, cases of multiple and overlapping identity divisions, application of context-specific variants of our theoretical
framework may yield interesting insights about the determinants of both social discrimination and inter-community conflict.
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Appendix A
Define XR ≡ xMR + xHR , XT ≡ xST + xHT . We shall prove Proposition 2 via the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and let gST * , gMR * be the values of gST and gMR , respectively, in some initial Nash equilibrium. Suppose
further that gST * , gMR * < 12. Then:
(i) given ρS , if a marginal change in any of the other parameters ρM , ρH and θ generates an increase (resp. decrease) in the equilibrium value of
( )
xMR
, then xHT must fall (resp. rise), and xST rise (resp. fall) in the new equilibrium;
X 2
R

(

xMR
XR 2

(ii) given ρS , ρH and θ, a marginal increase in ρM must imply a rise in the equilibrium values of both xMR and

)
.

Proof of Lemma 2.
Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, by Proposition 1, every Nash equilibrium must satisfy conditions (3.6)-(3.9). Suppose gST * , gMR * < 12 .
Then, by (3.2)-(3.3), we must have, in the initial equilibrium:
(N1)

xHT > xST , xHR > xMR .
[
It can be easily checked that: given any a, b > 0,

∂

]
a
(a+b)2

∂a

< 0(resp. > 0) iff a > b (resp. < b).

(N2)

( )
(i) Given ρS , suppose a marginal change in any of ρM , ρH and θ generates an increase (resp. decrease) in the equilibrium value of xXMR2 .
R
( )
xST
∂ X 2
( )
( )
T
Then, from (3.6), XxST2 must rise (resp. fall) as well. By (N1)-(N2), ∂xST > 0. If xHT does not fall (resp. rise) but XxST2 rises (resp.
T
T
( )
falls), then xST must rise (resp. fall). By (N1)-(N2),

∂

xHT
XT 2

∂xHT

< 0, and F′′ < 0.Therefore, given ρS , if xHT does not fall (resp. rise) even as

xST rises (resp. falls), then (3.8) cannot hold. Hence, xHT must fall (resp. rise). But, by the same argument as before, if xHT falls
(rises), then, from (3.8), xST must rise (resp. fall).
(ii) Given ρS , ρH and θ, suppose a marginal increase in ρM does not produce a rise in the equilibrium value of xMR . Then, since by
( )
( )
∂

xHR
XR 2

∂

xMR
XR 2

assumption F < 0, the RHS of (3.7) must fall. By (N1)-(N2), ∂xHR < 0. Then, by (3.7), xHR must rise. By (N1)-(N2), ∂xMR > 0.
( )
( )
Thus, if xMR does not rise and xHR does rise, then xXMR2 must fall. Hence, by (3.6) and (3.9), XxST2 must fall as well. Recall that, by
R
T
( )
x
∂ XST2
( )
T
(N1)-(N2), ∂xST > 0. Hence, if xHT does not rise but XxST2 falls, then xST must fall. But if xST falls, since F′′ < 0, the RHS of (3.8)
T
( )
′′

must fall, given ρS . This cannot satisfy (3.8) when xHT does not rise but xST falls, since, by (N1)-(N2),

∂

xHT
XT 2

< 0. Hence, xHT must
( )
rise, along with xHR . Since F < 0, this implies that, the RHS of (3.6) must rise. However, we have already established that XxST2
∂xHT

′′

T

must fall. In light of (3.6), we then have a contradiction, which establishes the claim that a marginal increase in ρM must generate a
rise in the equilibrium value of xMR .
(
(

)

∂

xMR
XR 2

)

Now suppose xMR rises, but xXMR2 does not rise. Then, since, by (N1)-(N2), ∂xMR > 0, xHR must rise. However, recalling (3.6) and
R
( )
xMR
(3.9), since X 2 does not rise, and since F′′ < 0, neither (ρB − xBT − xBR ) nor (ρU − xUT − xUR ) can fall, given ρH and θ. Thus, (xHT +xHR )
R
( )
( )
cannot rise. Then, since xHR rises, xHT must fall. Now, by (3.6) and (3.9), if xXMR2 does not rise then XxST2 cannot rise either. Since, by
R
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(
(N1)-(N2),

∂

xST
XT 2

)
> 0, it follows that xST must also fall if xHT falls. However, given ρS , a simultaneous decline in both xST and xHT is
( )

∂xST

incompatible with the satisfaction of (3.8), since F′′ < 0 and

2.

∂

xHT
XT 2

< 0 by (N1)-(N2). This contradiction establishes part (ii) of Lemma

∂xHT

Proof of Proposition 2.
Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, by Proposition 1, every Nash equilibrium must satisfy conditions (3.6)-(3.9). Suppose further that
gST * , gMR * < 12, so that (N1) holds.
(i) Noting (3.2), that the equilibrium value of gST falls with any decline in ρM follows immediately from Lemma 2. To show that gST
falls with any decline in ρS , we need to establish the following:
given ρH , ρS and θ, a marginal decline in ρM must reduce the equilibrium value of (ρM − xMR ).

(
∂

xHR
XR 2

(N3)
)

Suppose not. Then, since F′′ < 0, and since, by Lemma 2(ii), xMR must decline with a fall in ρM , from (3.7), recalling that ∂xHR < 0
( )
by (N1)-(N2), we can conclude that xHR must rise. But then xXMR2 must fall, and hence, since F′′ < 0, by (3.6) and (3.9), neither
R

(ρB − xBT − xBR ) nor (ρU − xUT − xUR ) can fall and at least one must rise. Given ρH , this implies (xHT +xHR ) must fall. Thus, since xHR
( )
x
∂ XST2
( )
T
increases, xHT must fall. Since, by (3.6), XxST2 must fall as well, recalling that ∂xST > 0 by (N1)-(N2), this implies xST must fall.
T
( )
However, since F′′ < 0, and

∂

xHT
XT 2

< 0 by (N1)-(N2), (3.8) cannot hold if xST and xHT both decline with ρS held constant. This
( )
contradiction establishes (N3). By Lemma 2(ii), given ρS , ρH and θ, a marginal decline in ρM must reduce xXMR2 as well. Then, by (3.6)
∂xHT

R

and (3.9), min{F (ρB − xBT − xBR ), F (ρU − xUT − xUR )} must fall. By (N3), since F′′ < 0, the decline in ρM must raise F (ρM − xMR ). Thus, if
′

′

ρM declines, then min{F (ρB −
′

′

xBT − xBR ),F (ρU − xUT − xUR )}
F′ (ρM − xMR )

′

′

declines as well. Using (3.6)-(3.7), we have:

′

xMR min{F (ρB − xBT − xBR ), F (ρU − xUT − xUR )}
=
.
F ′ (ρM − xMR )
xHR

(N4)

Recalling (3.3), it follows from (N4) that the equilibrium value of gMR falls in consequence of a marginal fall in ρM from any initial
situation where gMR < 12, given ρS , ρH and θ. Hence, starting from an initial situation where gMR < 12, any fall in ρM must reduce the
equilibrium value of gMR . Then, by an exactly analogous argument, it must be that the equilibrium value of gST falls with any decline in
ρS .
( )
(ii)-(iii)We first show that: given ρS , ρM , the equilibrium value of xXMR2 must fall if there is either an increase in ρH
R
(
)
(given θ) or a decrease in θ (given ρH ) over 0,θ .
(N5)
Suppose not. Then, by (3.6) and (3.9), recalling that F′′ < 0, at least one of xHT , xHR must increase. Without loss of generality,
( )
x
∂ XST2
( )
( )
T
xMR
xST
suppose xHT increases. If X 2 does not fall, then, by (3.6), X 2 cannot fall either. Hence, since, by (N1)-(N2), ∂xST > 0, it follows
R
T
(
)
that if xHT increases, xST must rise as well. Thus, if (N5) does not hold, then a rise in ρH (given θ) or a decline in θ over 0, θ (given ρH )
( )
must both imply an increase in the equilibrium values of xHT and xST . However, as

∂

xHT
XT 2

∂xHT

< 0 by (N1)-(N2)) and F′′ < 0, (3.8) cannot

hold if both xHT and xST rise from their initial equilibrium values, given ρS . This contradiction establishes (N5). Now note the following:
( )
xMR
must fall with an increase in θ over (θ, 1).
(N6)
X 2

given ρS , ρM and ρH , the equilibrium value of

R

Recall that, by Proposition 1, if θ ∈ (θ, 1), then xBT , xBR = 0 in equilibrium. Condition (N6) then follows by an argument exactly
analogous to that used to establish (N5). Lastly, recalling footnote (17), it can be shown that: given ρS , ρM and ρH , the equilibrium
[
]
values of gST and gMR must both remain invariant with respect to any change in θ over θ , θ .
(N7)
Together, Lemma 2(i), (3.2) and (N5), (N6) and (N7) yield parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2.
Appendix B
Table 6 and Table 7.□
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Table 6.
Alternative measures of community power – Household estimates of untouchability with district FE, using linear splines of θ.
With district FE

ρH
ρM
ρS
θ: decile 1 & 2
θ: decile 7–9
θ: decile 10
Intercept
Other controls
District FE
R2
N

Population share
0.3234***

Land share
0.0179

Land share per capita
− 0.0053

(7.78)
− 0.1663**

(0.33)
− 0.1565***

(1.49)
− 0.0010*

(2.48)
− 0.0175

(3.57)
− 0.1540*

(1.79)
0.0036

(0.29)
− 0.0354
(1.48)
− 0.0506**
(2.17)
0.0460
(1.09)
− 0.0141
(0.13)
Yes
Yes
0.11
12,715

(1.74)
− 0.0434*
(1.78)
0.0007
(0.03)
0.0546
(1.31)
0.1951*
(1.93)
Yes
Yes
0.09
12,715

(1.46)
− 0.0378
(1.39)
0.0126
(0.44)
− 0.0465
(1.45)
0.0522
(0.45)
Yes
Yes
0.12
6278

Note: This table shows the untouchability estimates using population share, land share and normalized land share per capita as alternative
measures of community power. Other controls are as per Equation (1) of Table 3A. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. T-statistics
are in the parentheses: significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 7
Alternative measures of community power – Household estimates of untouchability with district FE, using quadratic θ.
ρH
ρM
ρS
θ
θ2
Intercept
Other controls
District FE
R2
N

Population share
0.3229***

Land share
0.0168

Land share per capita
− 0.1381***

(9.24)
− 0.1575**

(0.30)
− 0.1565***

(5.20)
− 0.0006

(2.64)
0.0216

(3.54)
− 0.1461

(0.97)
− 0.0070

(0.39)
− 0.1263
(1.32)
0.1541
(1.24)
− 0.0120
(0.15)
Yes
Yes
0.10
13,678

(1.66)
0.0202
(0.19)
0.0305
(0.29)
0.1746*
(1.72)
Yes
Yes
0.09
12,715

(0.51)
0.0019
(0.65)
− 0.0000
(1.16)
0.1933*
(1.83)
Yes
Yes
0.13
5755

Note: This table shows the untouchability estimates using population share, land share and normalized land share per capita as alternative
measures of community power. Other controls are as per Equation (1) of Table 3A. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. T-statistics
are in the parentheses: significance level: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

References
Akerlof, G., 1976. The economics of caste and of the rat race and other woeful tales. Quart. J. Econ.90 (4), 599–617.
Ambedkar, B.R., 1946. Who Were the Shudras? Thacker, Bombay.
Anderson, S., 2011. Caste as an impediment to trade. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ.3 (1), 239–263.
Bakshi, D., Dasgupta, I., 2021. A subscription vs. appropriation framework for natural resource conflicts. In: Markandya, A., Rübbelke, D. (Eds.), Climate and
Development. World Scientific. Singapore, forthcoming.
Bakshi, D., Dasgupta, I., 2020. Identity conflict with cross-border spillovers. Defence and Peace Economics 31 (7), 786–809.
Bakshi, D., Dasgupta, I., 2018. A model of dynamic conflict in ethnocracies. Defence and Peace Economics 29 (2), 147–170.
Becker, G., 1957. The Economics of Discrimination. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Bergstrom, T.C., Blume, L., Varian, H., 1986. On the private provision of public goods. J. Public Econ. 29, 25–49.
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